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For new democracies emerging from destructive violence and massive human
fights abuses, reckoning with the past remains the most challenging question. The
difficulty lies in crafting a response that can strike the necessary-but inherently
problematic-balance among the victims and their families, the perpetrators of
horrendous crimes who demand that they be treated humanely and fairly, and a
nation that wants to see its past acknowledged while struggling to move forward
towards durable peace and democracy.
With the introduction of the state-run Gacaca jurisdictions' in June 2002,
Rwanda embarked upon what President Paul Kagame has described as "the only
way forward.",2 The law setting up the Gacaca jurisdictions was passed in 20003
by the Rwandan transitional government, and most recently amended in June
2004,4 to try thousands of genocide suspects by means of a decentralized, com-
munity-based system of courts inspired by local traditions. Attempting to reduce
delays in the overburdened criminal justice system, while at the same time seeking
justice and reconciliation, the Gacaca jurisdictions represent one of the boldest
* Maya Goldstein Bolocan has served as a Human Rights Officer and a Legal System Monitor
with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo/OSCE Pillar in 1999-2001, and has worked on rule of law
and technical legal assistance programs in transitional countries with the American Bar Association
Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI), in Washington, D.C. She holds an
LL.M. from Georgetown University (with Distinction); an LL.M. in International Human Rights Law
from Essex University (with Distinction); and a J.D. from the State University of Milan (with Distinc-
tion). The author would like to thank Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow for her invaluable, insightful
guidance and encouragement throughout the process of writing this article, as well as Lisa Bhansali,
Professor Jane Stromseth, and the editors of the Journal of Dispute Resolution for very useful com-
ments and suggestions. The author is solely responsible for the content of the article. Email: may-
agolds@yahoo.com.
1. The word "Gacaca" indicates in Kinyarwandan-Rwandan local language-the lawn or grass
where communities assemble to resolve community disputes. Although the new system is officially
called Inkiko-Gacaca (where the term Inkiko means "jurisdictions"), this article will refer to it by using
the terms "Gacaca," ".Gacaca courts," or "Gacaca jurisdictions."
2. Interview with Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda (July 16, 2002) (cited in Gacaca Jurisdic-
tions: Interim Report of Observations June 10 -Aug. 8, 2002), available at http://www.fas.harvard.ed
ursocstud/rwanda/introduction.html# ftn4 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Gacaca Jurisdic-
tions]. See generally the official web site of the Republic of Rwanda at http://www.rwandal.com/.
3. Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001 setting up "Gacaca jurisdictions" and Organizing
Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Commit-
ted Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, available at www. Inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/textes
legaux.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
4. Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 Establishing the Organization, Competence and Func-
tioning of Gacaca courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Geno-
cide and Other Crimes Against Humanity, Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 31,
1994, available at www.Inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
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and most original "legal-social, 5 experiments ever attempted in the field of transi-
tional justice. By blending retributive and restorative approaches in an innovative
way, Gacaca courts represent a unique opportunity to seek justice in an open,
accessible, and participatory fashion. Nonetheless, several deficiencies are pre-
sent in the Gacaca law--especially with respect to fair trial standards-that, cou-
pled with the prevalent political and human rights climate in Rwanda, may seri-
ously impair the effectiveness of the Gacaca jurisdictions in seeking justice.
Far from being irreconcilable, both a degree of retribution and reconciliation
are possible, and are indeed desirable, under Gacaca. This paper argues that shift-
ing the emphasis from the retributive nature of Gacaca to its restorative potential
may, in the long term, offer better perspectives of peace and reconciliation to a
deeply wounded society. It also argues that, where Gacaca retains its retributive
element, it should do so while trying to respect the human rights of those brought
before it. Part II of this paper briefly discusses the dominant model of transitional
justice, namely the prosecutorial approach of criminal trials, and its effectiveness
vis-A-vis alternatives that emphasize the search for truth and reconciliation instead
of retribution. Part III provides a brief background on the genocide in Rwanda
and examines the major shortcomings of criminal prosecutions by both the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and by the Rwandan government
in seeking justice and reconciliation. Part IV considers the newly conceived role
of the Gacaca jurisdictions in trying genocide-related cases. This section first
briefly reviews the traditional Gacaca as a community-based, informal dispute
resolution mechanism. It then presents the modernized, state-mandated Gacaca
jurisdictions and their role in complementing the ordinary criminal justice system.
Part V critically assesses the unique retributive and restorative nature of this sys-
tem, highlighting the tension between the two. It ponders some of the major bene-
fits (provision of accessible, participatory justice) and shortcomings (lack of due
process guarantees and adequate punishment), as well as the socio-political con-
text in which Gacaca courts operate. Part VI proposes ways to strike a balance
between these two conflicting approaches. It argues that if Gacaca is to retain a
retributive element, efforts should be made to minimize due process concerns. At
the same time, if the purpose is to achieve accountability while seeking reconcilia-
tion, the emphasis on restorative justice should be strengthened. This section of
the paper also suggests that Gacaca could be used in conjunction with a truth
commission. The conclusion highlights the potential benefits of Gacaca and its
contribution to devising future accountability mechanisms in the aftermath of
mass atrocities. It stresses that an approach that combines retributive and restora-
tive justice measures may better suit the complex needs of transitional societies.
II. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE
In the aftermath of mass violence and gross human rights abuses, both the
concerned societies and the international community struggle in finding responses
5. See Peter Uvin, The Introduction of a Modernized Gacaca for Judging Suspects of Participation
in the Genocide and the Massacres of 1994 in Rwanda (June 2000) (discussion paper) (prepared for the
Belgian Secretary of State for Development and Cooperation), available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/
humansecurity/scholarpapers.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
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that adequately address multiple, challenging, and often competing goals. While
seeking justice-in the strict sense of obtaining punishment for perpetrators and
redress for victims-is often the most immediate goal, there are other, critically
important, objectives that should be considered in devising mechanisms of ac-
countability. These include: rendering a truthful account of the past, pursuing
reconciliation, deterring and preventing the occurrence of future violence and
abuses, and advancing the rule of law while strengthening the foundations of the
new democratic order.6
While several approaches to accountability exist, this chapter focuses on two
often conflicting, but not irreconcilable, perspectives: retributive justice, and re-
storative justice.7
III. SETTLING ACCOUNTS: THE RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE MODEL
Since the Second World War, the dominant paradigm for dealing with past
human rights abuses has been the retributive form of justice embodied in the Nur-
emberg trials.8 This model of individual accountability forms the basis of modem
human rights law, which has now evolved to recognize the existence of a duty to
prosecute-at the international or national level-for crimes against humanity,
war crimes, genocide, and torture.
9
International criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda,
new hybrid international-national war crimes courts, the ever-growing list of
countries exercising universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity commit-
ted in other nations, and the establishment of the International Criminal Court,
have all contributed to the 'globalization' of the retributive approach, reinforcing
the view that the primary road to justice is through criminal prosecutions.' 0
Proponents of this form of accountability rightly observe that justice is all too
often bartered away for political settlements, with impunity as the bitter price to
be paid to secure an end to ongoing violence and repression."l They seem to share
the basic assumption that, although not always feasible, prosecuting perpetrators
6. See Jane E. Stromseth, Introduction: Goals and Challenges in the Pursuit of Accountability, in
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MASS ATROCITES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 1, 5-11 (Jane E. Stromseth
ed., 2003) (for a general discussion of goals of accountability efforts).
7. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian
Law and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights, in POST CONFLICT JUSTICE 3, 26-39 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 2002) (classifying accountability measures according to their goals: truth, justice and
redress). Accountability options include: international prosecutions, international and national investi-
gatory commissions, truth commissions, national prosecutions, national lustrations mechanisms, civil
remedies, and mechanisms for the reparation of victims. Id.
8. See Ruti Teitel, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 31-39 (2001).
9. For a general discussion of the duty to prosecute gross human rights abuses amounting to jus
cogens crimes under international law see Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 26. See also Diane F. Or-
entlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100
YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
10. See Mark A. Drumbl, Sclerosis: Retributive Justice and the Rwandan Genocide, 2 PUNISHMENT
& Soc'y 287, 296-97 (2000) [hereinafter Drumbl, Sclerosis] (stating that the "law and order" western
paradigm is "going global"). See also Peter E. Harrell, RWANDA'S GAMBLE: GACACA AND A NEW
MODEL OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 40 (2003) (referring to the prevalence of the "liberal-prosecutorial"
model in transitional justice).
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of mass atrocities is the optimal, preferable method for dealing with past injus-
tices.
Prosecutions for gross human rights abuses of a prior regime can indeed serve
several important functions. They can discourage future human rights abusers,
curtail vigilante, retaliatory justice, and foster respect for the rule of law and the
new democratic order.
12
Establishing individual accountability by way of criminal trials is not only es-
sential to achieve some degree of justice, but is also an effective way of demarcat-
ing the past from the present. As observed by Neil Kritz, trials communicate that
the "culture of impunity" that permitted heinous abuses to be perpetrated in the
first place is being replaced by a "culture of accountability," providing some de-
gree of security to victims while at the same time admonishing and deterring po-
tential future abusers. 13  Criminal prosecutions of human rights violators may
provide some victims with a "sense of justice and catharsis," a sense that, by hav-
ing addressed their grievances, their suffering can at last, more easily, come to an
end. 14
By assigning individual responsibility, criminal trials significantly point out
that specific individuals have committed the crimes in question, not an entire eth-
nic or religious group. The individualization of accountability and punishment
may not only be just, but also necessary to overcome dangerous "patterns of
vengeance and collective blame."'15 Thus, prosecutions may help curtail the recur-
rence of vigilante justice and promote social peace in the long term.' 6 Dispensing
justice through criminal trials may also favor reconciliation between victims and
offenders. 17 Failing to do so, on the other hand, fosters resentment and contempt
for the law and is deemed as one of the main reasons for the continued perpetra-
tion of grave human rights violations throughout the world. 18 Trials may also
provide a public account and acknowledgment of the past. When they are con-
ducted in accordance with full due process, they are deemed to represent "the
most authoritative" (if not the only) version of the truth. 19
12. Michael P. Sharf & Nigel Rodley, International Law Principles on Accountability, in POST
CONFLICT JUSTICE 89, 90 (Cherif M. Bassiouni ed., 2002).
13. Neil Kritz, Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-Conflict Justice, in POST
CONFLICT JUSTICE 55, 58 (Cherief M. Bassiouni ed., 2002) [hereinafter Kritz, Progress and Humility].
See also Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 2542 (identifying criminal punishment as "the most effective
insurance against future repression").
14. Neil Kritz, The Rule of Law in the Postconflict Phase, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES
OF AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 587, 595 (Chester A. Crocker & Fen Osler
Hampson eds., 1996) [hereinafter Kritz, Postconflict Phase].
15. See Stromseth, supra note 6, at 7. See also MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 122 (1998) (asserting that
trials may "convert the impulse for revenge into state-managed truth-seeking and punishment").
16. Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses, 19 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 301, 382 (2003).
17. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 6 (2003).
18. Shaf & Rodley, supra note 12, at 90 (referring to the conclusion of a report of the U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities).
19. Id. (stating that "criminal trials can generate a comprehensive record of the nature and extent of
the violations, how they were planned and executed, the fate of individual victims, who gave the orders
and who carried them out").
[Vol. 2
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While prosecutions can reinforce the rule of the law by discouraging personal
vendettas, failure to adequately punish former human rights abusers breeds cyni-
cism and distrust towards the new political order. As stated by Ruti Teitel, where
trials are in keeping with the "full procedural legality associated with working
democracies... [they] express public condemnation of aspects of the past, as well
as public legitimization of the new rule of law."
20
At a minimum, beyond any utilitarian justification, criminally prosecuting in-
dividual violators represents a moral duty owed to the victims of atrocious acts.
In particular, it affords them a partial remedy for their injuries and helps them
restore their dignity.
21
Prosecutions should be initiated, first and foremost, at the local level. Never-
theless, international prosecutions for gross human rights abuses may be able to
provide justice where the concerned national systems are unwilling or unable to
do so.22 International prosecutions present some advantages over national ones.
Unlike local trials, international justice may be less subject to allegations of
bias-or victor's justice.23  Justice dispensed through international forums will
also have a broader, more powerful impact than a domestic process.24 First, from
a deterrence point of view, it emphatically communicates to potential perpetrators
of atrocious crimes, not only in the country concerned, but worldwide, that they
will not escape international stigma and condemnation for such atrocities.25 Sec-
ond, it contributes to the development and interpretation of international criminal
and human rights laws.26
IV. THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The ability of the punitive approach to promote justice, social reunion, and
reconciliation through criminal trials has been questioned by some observers.27
Due to either lack of political will or scarcity of resources, transitional justice in
the form of criminal trials has been sporadic and selective, both at the local and
20. Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106
YALE L.J. 2009, 2037 (1997). See also David Dyzenhaus, Debating South Africa's Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 311 (1999) (stating that the "pursuit of retributive justice in
a transition to democracy is thought to be important, not only because of the intrinsic worth of doing
justice, but also because the enactment by the courts of the rituals of retributive justice will educate
society in the practices of the rule of law that are crucial to the stability of democracy").
21. Sharf & Rodley, supra note 12, at 90.
22. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenitpo-
tentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, art. 17,
Annex 1 (1998).




27. See generally Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for
Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 39 (2002); Erin Daly, Transformative
Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 73 (2002) [hereinafter Daly,
Transformative Justice]; David Little, A Different Kind of Justice: Dealing with Human Rights Viola-
tions in Transitional Societies, 13 ETHIcS & INT'L AFF. 65 (1999); MINoW, supra note 15, at 25-51
(for a general discussion of shortcomings of criminal prosecutions).
20041
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international level. 28 Because massive human rights violations are often perpe-
trated by a great number of people, far from fostering stability and reconciliation,
prosecution of every single perpetrator may be "politically destabilizing, socially
divisive, and logistically and economically untenable. 29 Where criminal prosecu-
tions have taken place, they have been time-consuming and incremental, invaria-
bly subject to compromise and pragmatism. 0 Moreover, they have frequently
been conducted in disregard of international due process guarantees. This has
made them subject to claims of partisan, victor's justice. Thus, prosecution of a
small number of perpetrators will be the best available option in most circum-
stances. Understandably, this selectivity has seriously undermined perceptions of
fairness.31
Criminal trials may also be incapable of producing a comprehensive version
of the truth both because of the circumscribed scope of each trial's inquiry with its
focus on specific, individual facts and events, and because of the manipulation and
misuse of rules of evidence characterizing their adversarial nature. 32 In this set-
ting, a victim's opportunity to tell her full story is often denied. By placing justice
in the hands of lawyers and impartial administrators, trials may have a disempow-
ering effect on victims, leaving them with the sense that justice has not been
done.aa
Because of their focus on the individual responsibility of voluntary perpetra-
tors, criminal prosecutions may be ill-suited to deal with gross human rights
28. See MtNow, supra note 15, at 122 (observing that, at best, tribunals can try only a small percent-
age of those involved in collective violence on the scale of what happened in Bosnia, Rwanda, Argen-
tina and Cambodia). See also Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Evaluating Justice
and Reconciliation Efforts (statements of Paul van Zyl excerpted from the panel discussion "Memory,
Justice and Reconciliation: Coming to Terms with the Past"), available at www.cceia.org/viewMedia.
php (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (arguing that in transitional scenarios it is often impossible to prosecute
more than a tiny fraction of those responsible for a variety of reasons: collapse or incapacitation of the
criminal justice system; impossibility of prosecution according to due process in criminal justice sys-
tems that have long functioned under authoritarian rule; the difficulty of making policy choices as to
whether to prosecute past or current crimes; challenges faced by practical difficulties of prosecuting
crimes of the state as opposed to ordinary crimes; difficulty in allocating scarce economic resources;
high cost of trials and their time consuming nature; difficulties linked to the issue of jurisdiction in
international trials).
29. Aukerman, supra note 27, at 51-52 (citing Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A
Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 127, 138-39 (1996)).
30. See Daly, Transformative Justice, supra note 27, at 103 (arguing that criminal prosecution "does
nothing to tell the anxious population that something is being done now to ease the pain" and that "a
strategy of extensive criminal trials is not an appropriate resolution for most current transitions").
31. See MINOW, supra note 15, at 40-45. See also Mark A. Drumbl, Toward a Criminology of
International Crime, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 263, 270-71 (2003) (arguing that selectivity also
compromises the deterrent value of prosecution) [hereinafter Drumbl, Criminology].
32. See Daly, Transformative Justice, supra note 27, at 103. See also Drumbl, Sclerosis, supra note
10, at 293 (affirming that courts create "microscopic and logical truths" emerging from carefully
controlled situations and based on a sequential proof of facts beyond a reasonable doubt); Donald W.
Shriver, Truth Commissions and Judicial Trials: Complementary or Antagonistic Servants of Public
Justice?, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 8-9 (2001) (arguing that the prohibition of hearsay, rumor, and even
references to previous criminal records may "screen out many version of fact," and comparing the
courtroom to a playing field in which the "most skilful, rather than the most truthful, side will win").
33. See Drumbl, Sclerosis, supra note 10, at 294 (stating that criminal trials may paradoxically lead
to a "conflict between victims and due process," where protecting the defendant's due process rights
may irremediably affect the scope, content and form of the victim's account).
[Vol. 2
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abuses committed by mass segments of the population. In such cases, in fact,
often individuals act collectively "with varying degrees of responsibility and un-
der varying degrees of coercion," which makes it difficult to apply ordinary prin-
ciples of criminal law.34 The focus on selected individuals cannot account for the
structural, inner causes of the violence or uncover the complex connections exist-
ing between people that made the massacres possible.
35
Finally, due to their adversarial and divisive nature, trials are not likely to
succeed in producing reconciliation, or at least stability, in highly polarized, post-
conflict societies.
International trials, while suffering from many of the shortcomings attributed
to domestic ones, also suffer the problems associated with "externalized" justice
due to their physical and psychological disconnect with the local population.36
This makes it more difficult for them to have an educational and deterrent impact,
provide victims with the sense that justice is being done, as well as foster new
democratic values.
37
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROSECUTORIAL MODEL: RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE
In the aftermath of mass violence, the exclusive recourse to criminal trials,
adjudication, and imprisonment as mechanisms of individual accountability may
do little to promote justice and societal regeneration. Advocates of a different
approach question the offender-specific, backward-looking, and strictly punitive
nature of the kind of justice normally associated with criminal trials, and suggest
alternative methods of reckoning with past abuses. 38 In their view, this type of
violence may require a "broader form of justice that includes reparations for vic-
tims, shaming for ambivalent bystanders, apologies from aggressors, and giving
some voice to victims." 
39
Unlike retributive justice, which considers crime primarily as an act against
the state and a violation of its laws, restorative justice views crime as a conflict
between individuals that results in injury to the victims, as well as the community
34. Daly, Transformative Justice, supra note 27, at 105. See also Aukerman, supra note 27, at 41
(arguing that mass atrocities such as genocide may be "qualitatively" different from ordinary crime
because of the number of victims involved and because they are typically undertaken, or at least sup-
ported, by state or quasi-state actors for political reasons).
35. See MiNow, supra note 15, at 47 (stating that trials are not an "ideal" tool in helping to achieve
consensus over controversial, complex events). See also Drumbl, Sclerosis, supra note 10, at 298
(arguing that situations of mass violence like the Rwandan genocide, where the deviant behavior is not
the exception but the rule, pose a significant challenge to criminal law, which is predicated upon pun-
ishing only deviant behavior, and that the characteristic dichotomy between innocence and guilt pro-
duced by trials downplays the importance of collective wrongdoing).
36. See Sriram, supra note 16, at 379-90.
37. Id.
38. See Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, supra note 28 (statements of David
Little).
39. See Mark A. Drumbl, The (Al)lure of the Genocide Trials, in EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 217, 219 (David Barnhizer ed., 2001) [hereinafter Drumbl, (Al)lure of
Genocide Trials]. See also Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert House, Institutions for Restorative Justice:
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 355, 388 (1999) (gen-
erally arguing that restorative justice is "model" justice in transitional contexts).
2004]
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and the offenders themselves.4° This approach envisions crime as a "violation of
people and relationships" that "creates obligations to make things right," and jus-
tice as an interactive process that engages the victim, the offender, and the whole
community in a search for solutions which promote reintegration, repair, recon-
ciliation, and reassurance. 41 Because crime is seen as an injury that violates per-
sonal and communal harmony, restorative justice adopts a process of "bringing
together the individuals who have been affected by an offense and having them
agree on how to repair the harm caused by the crime" in an attempt to restore
victims, offenders, and communities in a way that all stakeholders can agree is
just.42 These principles seem to situate restorative justice between vengeance and
forgiveness. Unlike retribution, restorative justice is forward-looking-it tries to
repair the relationships that have been broken by the offense and to reduce the
causes of hostility and estrangement through reparations and compensation. 43 It is
also a victim-centered process, as it Rrovides a forum in which offenders listen to
victims and answer their questions. In this way, "victims can hear offenders
explain the circumstances behind the crime, express remorse, and take responsibil-
ity."'45 In order to achieve healing, restorative justice calls for restitution to the
victim by the offender.46 This is intended to restore the victim's status to the ex-
tent that is possible and to stop the cycle of violence, instead of escalating it
through retributive, or forceful, responses. 47 Restitution is also an act of account-
40. See Laura Stovel, When the Enemy Comes Home: Restoring Justice After Mass Atrocity 2-3
(June 2003) (paper presented at the Restorative Justice Conference, Vancouver), available at www.sfu.
ca (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
41. HowARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW Focus FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 181 (1990). See
also Stovel, supra note 40, at 2. The two approaches to justice reflect two distinct ethics. "The ethic
of the dominant legalistic justice system emphasizes obedience to moral principles presumed to be
partly reflected in the law. Id. It views crime as law breaking and a violation against the state and
accountability as punishment for breaking the law." Id. Restorative justice, on the other hand, reflects
an ethic of care according to which people are ethically responsible for people with whom they have a
relationship. Id. While legalistic justice views justice primarily as procedural equality, and appropri-
ate punishment for the crime by impartial adjudicators, restorative justice assumes that humans are
relational beings who need to live in community with others, and sees a crime as a violation of another
person. Id. at 3. The injury thus caused not only violates the victim and those close to him, but also
creates "rifts" between the community, and both the victim and the offender. Id. When a crime oc-
curs, the victim feels less secure in the community and needs to heal from the shock, while the "of-
fender has lost the trust of both the victim and the community and has to work to earn that back." Id.
at 3-4.
42. David Dolinko, Restorative Justice and the Justification of Punishment, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 319,
320 (discussing John Braithwaite's approach to restorative justice). See Carrie J. Niebur Eisnaugle,
Note, An International "Truth Commission": Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative to Retri-
bution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 214 (2003) (arguing that restorative justice focuses on dia-
logue between individuals or groups that are in conflict by encouraging them to deal with each other
directly, face to face, rather than through an advocate such as a lawyer or a diplomat). The two main
approaches to restorative justice are family group conferencing and victim-offender mediation. Stovel,
supra note 40, at 4.
43. Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, supra note 28 (statements of David Little).
44. Stovel, supra note 40, at 5-6.
45. Id. at 6. Stovel argues that, "Beyond testifying, victims are rarely considered in criminal trials
processes." Id. at 5. "Their needs to have input in the trial, receive information, ask offenders ques-
tions and receive compensation from him are rarely met." Id. "[O]ffenders have no incentive to coop-
erate in the process of truth telling." Id. at 6. "Trials are ill-suited to bring out plentiful and context
rich information." Id.
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ability, where the offender takes responsibility for the harm caused and takes ac-
tion to repair it.48 Restorative justice may also be the best way to reintegrate of-
fenders back into their communities and allow them to make amends for their
actions. 49 Finally, it empowers communities to seize and deal with conflicts and
tensions that arise between them.5 °
In recent years, some commentators have seen restorative justice as having
the potential to address-at least in part-the needs of the victims of mass atroci-
ties, while providing some degree of accountability and enhancing the prospects
of a peaceful transition. 51 This different kind of justice may be used in alternative,
or better in parallel to, normal judicial procedures, normally in the form of truth
commissions.52 The benefits of this approach in the context of transitional socie-
ties emerging from violence seem to be significant. "It is the form of justice most
directly concerned with reconciliation [because] [ilt addresses the reintegrative
needs of both victims and perpetrators. 53 In poor countries with weak, ineffi-
cient, and corrupt judicial systems, it offers an alternative to lengthy and expen-
sive trials that often lack any public credibility. 54 In such cases, full public disclo-
sure of government sponsored crimes, coupled with sincere apologies and com-
pensation, may be preferable to the unrealistic prospect of destabilizing mass
criminal prosecutions. Finally, as is sometimes the case, this form of justice may
draw on pre-existing restorative justice practices that are deeply embedded in the
local culture.
55
Truth commissions have thus been able to provide an appealing middle
ground between retribution and amnesia, while at the same time representing an
avenue through which a more holistic notion of accountability for human rights
abuses can be pursued.56 Although different models exist, the purpose of most
truth commissions is to investigate widespread human rights abuses and provide
an accurate, official account of the past, and of the broader context in which the
violence occurred, while at the same time offering victims a forum to tell their
stories and be vindicated, thus achieving some sense of closure.57
48. Id.
49. Stovel, supra note 40, at 7.
50. Id. at 8 (arguing that professionalized justice "steals the conflicts" from the community and robs
it of its power, ability, and confidence to face trouble and restore peace).
51. See Aukerman, supra note 27, at 81 (stating that restorative justice as a form of conflict resolu-
tion is certainly relevant to transitional justice, where the latter's aim is to achieve "enough forgive-
ness, reconciliation, or healing to make coexistence possible").
52. Eisnaugle, supra note 42, at 222.
53. Stovel, supra note 40, at 1.
54. Id.
55. Truth and reconciliation commissions established in South Africa and, more recently, in East
Timor and Sierra Leone rely on, and incorporate-to a certain extent--customary practices and tradi-
tions reflecting a restorative justice philosophy.
56. See Eisnaugle, supra note 42, at 215 (observing that restorative justice offers "a more 'holistic'
approach to conflicts than other forms of justice because it is not directed at primarily inflicting suffer-
ing on the offender, but rather focuses on the needs of all parties involved in the crime"). See also
Llewellyn & House, supra note 39, at 356 (arguing that the restorative justice philosophy permeating
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission offered not only a different, but also a supe-
rior model of justice).
57. See Aukerman, supra note 27, at 82 (stating that truth commissions "can focus on victims, craft a
shared narrative about the past as the basis for a [common] future," and return conflicts to those con-
cerned by "active[ly] involv[ing] victims, perpetrators, and the larger community"). See also Eis-
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While several truth commissions have proliferated around the world over the
last twenty years, the most successful to date has been the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)-a semi-judicial body established in 1995
to investigate apartheid era crimes-that expressly endorses a restorative justice
philosophy in its mandate. 58 The fruit of political compromise and broad-based
consultations, the TRC was seen as representing a bridge between the past of a
violent and divided society, and a "future founded on human rights, democracy
and peaceful coexistence" for all South Africans. 59 Trading truth for amnesty, the
TRC's main goals were to uncover the truth concerning victims and perpetrators,
to restore the dignity of victims and survivors, as well as to search for healing and
national reconciliation. 6° While granting amnesty to selected individuals was a
controversial aspect of the TRC, it proved to be an extremely effective mechanism
in identifying responsibility for human rights abuses. 61 Over a period of two
years, the TRC gathered testimonies from approximately 24,000 victims of human
rights abuses. 6 2 It also received amnesty applications and statements from thou-
sands of perpetrators. 63 This narrative process gave victims a chance to relate
their suffering, thus providing them with the specific acknowledgment and vindi-
cation they had long been denied and, in most cases, with cathartic and psycho-
logically beneficial effects.64 It helped relatives of those victims to uncover the
specific truth regarding abuses committed on their loved ones.65 Finally, the same
naugle, supra note 42, at 224 (reporting that more than twenty truth commissions have been estab-
lished around the world over the last two decades).
58. This was based on the belief that transcending the divisions of the past required "understanding
but not ... vengeance . . . reparation but not ... retaliation." DION A. BASSON, S. AFR. INTERIM
CONST., TEXT AND NOTES 1, 339 (1993). The notion of African ubuntu (i.e. the recognition of human-
ity in everyone) pervades the TRC. Unlike previous truth commissions, the TRC had the power to
compel testimony, to stimulate participation by perpetrators in exchange for amnesty, and to link
victim testimony to subsequent reparations.
59. Charles Villa-Vicencio, Restorative Justice in Social Context: The South Africa Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, in BURYING THE PAST: MAKING PEACE AND DOING JUSTICE AFTER CIVIL
CONFLICT 207, 207-08 (Nigel Biggar ed., 2001) (quoting Postamble to the [S. AFR]. INTERIM CONST.
(Act No. 200 of 1993)).
60. Id. at 209. The TRC was composed of the following committees: the human rights committee,
the amnesty committee, and the reparations and rehabilitation committee. MINOw, supra note 15, at
60.
61. Paul van Zyl, Unfinished Business: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Contribution to
Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in POST CONFLICT JUSTICE 743, 751 (Cherif M. Bassiouni ed.,
2002). Amnesty from criminal and civil prosecutions was granted upon full disclosure of one's in-
volvement in political crimes. The amnesty provisions created an enormous incentive on prospective
applicants to reveal their responsibility in past abuses, due to their fear of being implicated by their
accomplices. Id. Due to its reliance on self-incrimination, it permitted the TRC to obtain invaluable
evidence about past human rights violations without being burdened by due process requirements. Id.
at 751-52. Requiring the applicant to prove that the acts had been politically motivated, as opposed to
being motivated by personal consideration (which would have resulted in the denial of the grant of
amnesty), often caused a "chain reaction" with applicants implicating senior political or other leaders.
Id. at 752.
62. Id. at 746.
63. Id. at 751.
64. Id. at 747-48. See also Jonathan Allen, Balancing Justice and Social Unity: Political Theory
and the Idea of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 315 (1999) (generally
arguing that the TRC conferred on victims dignity, consideration, and respect by providing them with a
forum where they could recount their stories of oppression in a way that forensic constraints of a
courtroom would not permit).
65. van Zyl, supra note 61, at 748.
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process also contributed towards the establishment of a social truth regarding the
nature and the impact of human rights abuses on the victims and their families,
making it almost impossible to refute and distort such reality.66
The TRC hearings allowed both the victims and the perpetrators to tell their
side of the story, ask questions, and talk about the impact and consequences of the
violence on their lives in order to try to achieve healing. The punishment imposed
on those found guilty of apartheid crimes-where they were given amnesty-was
not retributive punishment, but was expressed in terms of shame, ostracism, and
moral opprobrium. 67 The assumption was that, given an admission of guilt on the
part of those involved in various crimes, the process of forgiveness and, ulti-
mately, reconciliation would be significantly advanced, funding the basis for a
new moral relationship. In the most optimistic views, public testimonies and
acknowledgments of the past provided an opportunity for individuals and the na-
tion as a whole to heal.69 Importantly, the TRC also held a series of institutional
hearings to inquire into the acquiescence and responsibilities of professions and
institutions deeply implicated in the apartheid. 70 Though some of those called to
participate failed to come forward, these hearings nonetheless highlighted the
corrupt and vicious nature of the regime, thus providing a wider context to the
uncovered individual abuses.7' While the commission rightly focused on crimes
committed by the apartheid regime, it also made important statements concerning
the responsibility of members of the liberation movement for human rights abuses
committed by them.72
The TRC has sometimes been criticized for denying justice to victims, be-
cause it let those responsible of horrible crimes walk away with impunity and
without showing any remorse-the TRC legislation only required truth.73 It has
66. Id. at 746-47.
67. Daly, Transformative Justice, supra note 27, at 154. See also Llewellyn & House, supra note
39, at 357 (stating that, "The [TRC'sl emphasis [was] on reintegrative measures that ... rebuild social
bonds, as opposed to measures such as imprisonment that isolate and alienate the perpetrator from
society").
68. See generally MtNOw, supra note 15; Allen, supra note 64.
69. MrNow, supra note 15, at 61.
70. van Zyl, supra note 61, at 749, 751-52.
71. David Dyzenhaus, With the Benefit of Hindsight 1-3 (June 7-9, 1999) (paper delivered at the
conference, "TRC: Commissioning the Past," University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg), at
www.trcresearch.org.za/papers99/dyzenhaus.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (reporting that the institu-
tional hearings were held into the role of the media, the health sector, business and labor, religious
organizations and the prisons). In October 1997, the TRC held a three day hearing into the role of the
legal community during the apartheid regime. See id. Partly prompted by the judges' refusal to attend
the hearing, this focused on their responsibilities and the abdication of their duty to respect the rule of
law during the apartheid era. Id.
72. van Zyl, supra note 61, at 752-53. See also Dyzenhaus, supra note 71, at 26 (reporting that the
idea for the TRC originated in the context of an African National Congress initiative in the early 1990s
to appoint commissions to inquire into the brutalities committed by its own soldiers in training camps).
73. Stephen A. Garrett, Models of Transitional Justice: A Comparative Analysis (Mar. 14-18, 2000)
(paper prepared for the International Studies Association 41' Annual Convention) (stating that the
central ethical dilemma posed by the TRC was whether those who are guilty of brutal crimes should be
allowed to go free simply by offering a potentially hypocritical and false contrition for past wrongs), at
www.ciaonet.org/isa/gas02/gasO2.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2004). But see MiNOW, supra note 15, at
56 (stating that, far from granting blanket amnesty, the TRC left the door open for prosecutions and
civil suits to be brought against those who did not apply for, or were not granted amnesty). See also
Benjamin N. Schiff, Do Truth Commissions Promote Accountability or Impunity? The Case of the
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also been criticized, rightly, for having failed to provide adequate reparation to
apartheid victims. 74 While the failure of the current South African government to
vigorously prosecute those who failed to seek, or those who were denied, amnesty
has been held by some observers as reflecting the limits of the TRC, it rather
seems to underscore the inadequacy, weaknesses and biases of the legal system.
75
Despite these criticisms, the TRC was an overall success. Notably, the TRC
condemned and fully revealed a heinous regime, restored victims' dignity by giv-
ing public legitimacy to their stories, laid the foundations for the promotion of a
human fights-based culture, and instilled in ordinary South Africans a determina-
tion that the injustices of the past should never happen again.
VI. STRIKING THE BALANCE: JUSTICE, TRUTH, AND RECONCILIATION
Truth and accountability are essential if societies traumatized by mass atroci-
ties are to limit destructive ethnic, religious, political and racial conflicts and to
recover a degree of stability and peace. What means a society chooses to deal
with the past will reflect the balance between competing, multiple goals and will
be necessarily context-driven. A combination of factors-social, political, eco-
nomic, and cultural-should determine what form of justice is not only desirable,
but also pragmatically feasible and realistic, in a particular transitional context.
76
These factors include the gravity of the violation, the extent and severity of the
victimization, the number of and those who are the accused, the extent to which
the violence has subsided, the community's will, as well as the type and nature of
the new government. 77 As observed by Mark Drumbl, in the aftermath of broad-
based violence involving thousands of victims and perpetrators, like in Rwanda,
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in POST CONFLICT JUSTICE, 325, 331 (Cherief M.
Bassiouni ed., 2002) (arguing that fears that the TRC would be too generous in granting amnesty are
unfounded since, by late 2000, while the commission had received 7,112 applications for amnesty, it
had granted only 849 of these; arguing also that the de facto impunity for most of the "architects of
apartheid" was due to the "bias and incapacity" of the legal system, not to the TRC's failure).
74. Those who were granted amnesty were under no obligation to make any compensation to victims
or the society. This aspect was criticized even by the most fervent supporters of the TRC. See Lle-
wellyn & House, supra note 39, at 388 (arguing that "removing reparation from the amnesty process
[not only] seriously limits the connection between amnesty and restoring the victim [but also that], as
far as the perpetrator is concerned, amnesty without any way to make amends for one's actions could
result [in a] 'shaming machine,' serving to stigmatize, rather than reintegrate, perpetrators"). See also
Daly, Transformative Justice, supra note 27, at 156 (stating that the TRC "produced an imbalance of
justice: it granted amnesty to some perpetrators but did not secure meaningful reparations to any vic-
tims"); Naomi Roth-Arriaza, Reparations Decision and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 157, 174 (reporting that, in 2003, South African President Mbeki proposed a one-time grant of
about $3,500 to each victim, a fact that has been strongly criticized by victims' groups).
75. See Schiff, supra note 73, at 341 (observing that the TRC's effect upon impunity appears
"mixed" and that, if considered vis-N-vis a weak legal system, it has the merit of having exposed at
least violations committed by some perpetrators).
76. See Aukerman, supra note 27, at 92; MiNow, supra note 15, at 50 (stating that trials should not
be pursued "where there is no chance for or perception of fairness or where there are overwhelming
disparities between the resources and will needed"). See also Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Recon-
structive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355, 367 (2002) [here-
inafter Daly, Punitive and Reconstructive Justice] (stating that "[a]ny response Rwanda develops not
only must be consistent with principles of justice but also be pragmatically feasible," and that "U]ustice
that exists only in theory is no[t] justice at all").
77. Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 41-42.
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the "social geography" of the society in question, including its demographic com-
position, dynamic of group relations, and political makeup, should play a central
role in the consideration and selection of accountability responses. 78 While some
form of retribution for the most paradigmatic abusers seems necessary to avoid
trivializing victims' suffering and to achieve a degree of justice, this will generally
not suffice. Far from being mutually exclusive, blended response and mixed poli-
cies, including trials for the most paradigmatic violations, public inquiries, media-
tion, amnesties, and truth commissions, may be more effective in providing a
degree of justice and the necessary societal reconciliation.79
Rwanda represents an interesting test case where solutions have been crea-
tively devised to remedy shortcomings of the criminal trials paradigm. The
Gacaca law adopts an innovative and unique approach by combining the punitive-
retributive goals normally associated with criminal trials, with restorative meas-
ures promoting reconciliation and rehabilitation. This poses the main question of
how to strike the right balance between the backward-looking, reactive nature of
retribution, and forward-looking, restorative justice principles.
VII. JUSTICE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GENOCIDE: JUSTICE DENIED
In the aftermath of the genocide, both the international community and the
Rwandan government have sought to achieve accountability for unspeakable
crimes by way of the Western retributive model of justice embodied in criminal
prosecutions. Given the magnitude of the genocide, including the fact that thou-
sands were involved as victims and perpetrators, and the inadequacies and short-
comings characterizing both the international and the domestic trials, the general
perception is that justice, accountability, and reconciliation have not been
achieved.
78. See Drumbl, (Al)lure of Genocide Trials, supra note 39, at 219 (advocating for blended re-
sponses and policies to redress genocidal violence); Aukerman, supra note 27, at 41. Aukerman ques-
tions the applicability of the "ordinary crime" prosecution paradigm to "massive human rights atroci-
ties" involving numerous individuals, and challenges the view that prosecutions are the best way of
redressing criminal actions in the context of transitional justice. Id. The author concludes that "[We]
must first determine the goals of transitional justice, and then decide on the priority to be given to
prosecution." Id. at 92. See also Jeremy Sarkin, The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in
Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the
Genocide, 45 J. AFR. L. 143, 288-89 (2001) (stating that "[u]niversal application of a retributive justice
model runs the risk of devaluating the importance of context in determining whether such a model will
be effective in redressing mass atrocity in the affected society" and that "if retributive justice is imple-
mented without a pre-existing contextual inquiry, a disjuncture might ... emerge between the impera-
tive to implement trials and the consequences these trials may have on the post-genocidal society").
79. See Drumbl, (Al)lure of Genocide Trials, supra note 39, at 219. This heterogeneous approach
seems to be confirmed by the Velasquez-Rodriguez judgment, in which the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights holistically defined justice to encompass the needs of the victims, as well as the impera-
tive to reform state institutions to prevent future abuses. In that case, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights stated that a state is bound to fulfill the following obligations in response to the com-
mission of a gross violation of human rights: conduct an investigation to establish the truth regarding
the violation suffered by the victim and capable of identifying the perpetrators of such violation;
prosecute those responsible for the violation; provide reparation or compensation to the victims of
human rights violation; take steps to ensure that the violation does not recur in the future. See Velas-
quez-Rodriguez, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (1988).
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VIII. BACKGROUND TO THE GENOCIDE AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
Between April and July 1994, an estimated 800,000 RwandansS°-roughly
ten percent of the entire population-were ruthlessly massacred in what was a
"carefully planned and orchestrated slaughter, coordinated at the highest level of
the state." 1 The genocide was triggered by the assassination of the Rwandan
Hutu President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994 when the plane on which he was
flying was shot down as it was approaching Kigali airport. 2 Although the country
had experienced waves of violence since it obtained independence in 1962,83 what
was strikingly unique to the 1994 aggression were its savage brutality and the
extent of the involvement of both victims and perpetrators. Relying on massive
government-sponsored propaganda dehumanizing the Tutsi, and on the subservi-
ence of Rwanda's highly hierarchical society, the meticulously planned, efficient
genocidal campaign was led by all the main actors within the then Hutu domi-
nated government. These included the Presidential Guard, the Rwandan Armed
Forces (RAF), as well as local politicians and administrators whose main task was
to mobilize and involve thousands of Hutu citizens in slaughtering their own
neighbors.84 The killings were carried out with the most shocking, sadistic cruelty
by using machetes, clubs, axes, knives, grenades, and guns.85 Those responsible
for the violence beat their victims to death, amputated their limbs, buried them
alive, raped, and killed them.86 Victims included women, men, and children, as
"[n]o survivors were to be left to tell the story.,
87
80. A recent census conducted by the Rwandan government reports that 937,000 Rwandans died in
the genocide. Integrated Regional Information Networks, Rwanda: Census finds 937,000 died in
genocide, RELIEFWEB, Apr. 2, 2004, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/F308B7EC241
68C9885256E6A00558A7D (last visited Oct. 24, 2004). Although the number of victims will never
be known with certainty, even the most conservative estimates indicate that over three quarters of the
entire Tutsi population were killed. See Organization of African Unity, Rwanda, the Preventable
Genocide § 14.80 (July 2000) [hereinafter O.A.U. Report].
81. See RWANDA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN DIALOGUE: ADDRESSING THE LEGACIES OF GENOCIDE
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 2 (Charles Villa-Vincencio & Tyrone Savage eds., 2001) [hereinaf-
ter RWANDA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN DIALOGUE].
82. In the plane crash, the President of Burundi was also assassinated.
83. Prior to the genocide, the population of Rwanda consisted of an estimated 85 percent Hutu, 14
percent Tutsi, and 1 percent Twa. Past ethnic and political divisions between Hum and Tutsi, fostered
and fueled by the colonial "divide and rule" policy, led to large scale massacres mostly perpetrated
against Tutsi in 1963 and 1966. See RWANDA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN DIALOGUE, supra note 81, at 4-
7. About 10,000 Tutsi were killed and 170,000 were driven into exile between 1959 and 1961 when a
Hutu supported by the Belgians deposed the Tutsi monarchy. Following several attempts by the Tutsi
to overthrow the Rwandese government, some 20,000 Tutsi were massacred. Amnesty International,
Rwanda Gacaca: A Question of Justice 4 (Dec. 2002) [hereinafter Amnesty International, Question of
Justice].
84. The genocide was "so routine, so sustained, that the perpetrators simply called it "work" ... [it]
was-according to its very design-a highly public affair, whose organizers actively sought to enlist in
its deadly "work" the maximum possible number of Hutu participants. See Helena Cobban, The Lega-
cies of Collective Violence: The Rwandan Genocide and the Limits of Law, available at http://boston
review.net/BR27.2/cobban.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2004). See also Daly, Punitive and Reconstruc-
tive Justice, supra note 76, at 364 (reporting that an estimated 650,000, about one tenth of the Hutu
population, participated in the killings).
85. O.A.U. Report, supra note 80, § 14.26.
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The genocide was stopped only in July 1994, when the Rwandan Patriotic
Army (RPA)-primarily composed of Tutsi 6migr6s in Uganda-took control of
Kigali and ousted the Hutu regime, establishing the Rwandan transitional gov-
ernment of National Unity. 88 The government has since been dominated by the
main Tutsi party-the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-whose leader, Paul Ka-
game, won a landslide victory in elections held in August 2003.89
In the aftermath of the genocide, Rwanda was a wrecked country with no
functioning institutions or infrastructure. Of the seven million inhabitants before
the genocide, about three quarters had been killed, displaced, or fled.90 The rest
were like walking dead, left to grasp with a bewildering reality.
It is in this scenario that the transitional government was confronted with the
daunting task of dealing with the masses of alleged perpetrators in an attempt to
break the vicious cycle of impunity that had permitted the genocide to happen in
the first place. 9' To be effective, any legal response to such broad-based violence
needed to achieve the multiple, competing goals of justice, reconciliation, and
deterrence. Despite progress in the country's reconstruction since the genocide,
Rwanda remains a deeply divided, traumatized society, where ethnic polarization
runs high beneath tight government control.
IX. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
Established under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in 1994, the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was conceived to bring to jus-
tice the most serious perpetrators of the genocide, and other violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law, by way of an impartial forum that would avoid the per-
ception of victor's justice in Rwanda.92 With its creation, the international com-
munity was to send to the world the unequivocal message that the appaling crimes
committed in Rwanda clearly violated international law and would not be toler-
ated in the future. 93 Finally, it was hoped that trials before the tribunal could ulti-
mately contribute to the process of national reconciliation, the restoration of
peace, and the prevention of future genocide in Rwanda.94
88. See Drumbl, Sclerosis, supra note 10, at 288. The RPA is the army of the rebel Tutsi political
party Rwandan Patriotic Front. See generally Mark A. Drumbi & Kenneth S. Gallant, Appeals in the
Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: Structure, Procedure, and Recent Cases, 3 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 589, 604 (2001).
89. Paul Kagame, the Tutsi RPF's leader responsible for stopping the 1994 genocide, won 95 per-
cent of the votes. See Kagame Won, a little too well, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2003, available at
www.economist.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Kagame Won].
90. O.A.U. Report, supra note 80, § 17.3.
91. Harrell, supra note 10, at 37 (stating that justice was seen both as a moral duty to the survivors
and as necessary to break the cycle of impunity while seeking reconciliation).
92. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). See also Statute of the
ICTR, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg., Annex, art. 1-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
93. See Jason Strain & Elizabeth Keyes, Accountability in the Aftermath of Rwanda's Genocide, in
AccouNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 87, 98-99 (Jane E.
Stromseth ed., 2003).
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Significantly, the ICTR was the first international court ever to deliver ver-
dicts in relation to genocide.95 But, while the tribunal has made some relevant
contributions by setting new important legal precedents in the field of human
rights and humanitarian law, 96 it has nonetheless been looked upon with growing
skepticism, not only by the Rwandan government, but also by some foreign ob-
servers.97 Since its establishment, managerial, administrative and logistical defi-
ciencies have compromised its ability to deliver justice effectively and swiftly. 98
As of September 2004, only nineteen judgments have been handed down involv-
ing twenty-three accused.9 Rwanda's disappointment with the slow pace of jus-
tice has been further exacerbated by the realization that the tribunal consumes
disproportionately conspicuous resources at the expense of the national judicial
system.1°° Recent plans to complete all tribunal's activities by 2010 further con-
tribute to the bitterness felt by many Rwandans vis-A-vis an international commu-
nity perceived as indifferent to their quest for justice. 10'
The tribunal has also been regarded by the majority of Rwandans as the em-
bodiment of victor's justice, in that it has failed to investigate war crimes commit-
ted by the RPF, despite the fact that these fall within its mandate.'
0 2
Furthermore, the tribunal has been criticized for failing to deliver to its "pri-
mary audience"-i.e. the society victimized by the violence.'0 3 The effectiveness
of the tribunal in delivering justice while seeking peace and reconciliation has
95. ICTR, General Information, available at http://www.ictr.org/default.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2004) [hereinafter ICTR, General Information].
96. The ICTR has delivered the first conviction in history of a former head of government, former
Prime Minister Kambanda, for genocide; has recognized that rape and sexual violence constitute geno-
cidal acts when committed with the intent to destroy a protected group; and has defined the contour of
rape as a crime against humanity. Roman Boed, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in
POST CONFLICT JUSTICE 487, 493 (Cherif M. Bassiouni ed., 2002).
97. Rwanda, at the time a member of the Security Council, was the only country to vote against the
resolution establishing the ICTR. Among the reasons for this position, the limited temporal jurisdic-
tion of the ICTR and its refusal to impose the death penalty. See Strain & Keyes, supra note 93, at
104-09. For a critique of the ICTR performance, see Drumbl, (Al)lure of Genocide Trials, supra note
39, at 227 (criticizing ICTR proceedings for being slow, very expensive, selective, subject to due
process challenges and widely perceived as illegitimate by Rwandans). See also Makau Mutua, From
Nuremberg to the Rwanda Tribunal: Justice or Retribution?, BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 77, 78-79
(2000) (arguing that the contribution of the ICTR to the protection of human rights as well as the
process of peace and normalization inside Rwanda is "marginal, if not entirely irrelevant," and that the
tribunal is alien to "political realities and removed from both the individual and national psyches of the
victims as well as the victors in the Rwanda conflict").
98. Pernille Ironside, Rwandan Gacaca: Seeking Alternative Means to Justice, Peace and Recon-
ciliation, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 31, 35 (2002).
99. ICTR, Fact Sheet No. 1, The Tribunal at a Glance, available at http://www.ictr.org/default.htm
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004) [hereinafter ICTR, Fact Sheet No. 1].
100. Former Rwandan General Prosecutor Gerald Gahima, Re-establishing the Rule of Law and
Encouraging Good Governance (Sept. 9, 2002) (presented at the 55th Annual DPI/NGO Conference)
[hereinafter Gahimal (condemning the manifest bias of the international community towards interna-
tional mechanisms at the expense of national systems). In 2002-2003, the UN General Assembly
allotted to the ICTR a total budget of $177,739,400. See ICTR, General Information, supra note 95.
101. The ICTR first submitted its completion strategy to the UN Security Council in July 2003.
According to the plan, ICTR's investigations are due to be completed by the end of 2004, while all
trials and appeals are expected to be terminated by, respectively, 2008 and 2010. See ICTR, Fact Sheet
No. 1, supra note 99.
102. On the jurisdiction of the ICTR, see Statute of the ICTR, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d
mtg., at preamble, arts. 1-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
103. See Kritz, Progress and Humility, supra note 13, at 59.
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indeed been frustrated by its inaccessibility to ordinary Rwandans. While its loca-
tion in "neutral" land-Arusha, Tanzania-was to send a message of impartiality,
it makes it in fact impractical-if not impossible-for Rwandans to attend court
proceedings or hear news of ICTR trials. 104 This, and the virtually total exclusion
of victims from the tribunal proceedings, has led some critics to see the tribunal as
being largely inaccessible, distant, and as having a minimal and disempowering
impact on victims' lives. 10 5 It is no surprise, therefore, that Rwandans regard the
tribunal as a "foreign and removed body alien in procedure, whose slow pace of
trials is proof of UN inefficiency, or worse, indifferent to Rwandan needs."
' ' 6
Given the limited capability of the ICTR to deliver justice, the Rwandan gov-
ernment has turned to the national judicial system as the principle means to de-
liver accountability and end the cycle of impunity.
X. ENDING IMPUNITY IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA: THE 1996 GENOCIDE
LAW
Despite its almost complete human and physical incapacitation, and the im-
possible challenge posed by having to deal with the genocide on such a wide-
spread scale, the prosecution of genocide suspects was looked upon by the Rwan-
dan government as the only way of ending impunity and as an essential precondi-
tion to achieving stability and reconciliation. 10 7  This determination was to be
faced by a crude reality. In the aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan provi-
sional government of National Unity was faced with the enormous and urgent
challenge of re-building the judicial system virtually from scratch.'0 8 The events
of the spring 1994 had in fact devastated the already limited judicial infrastructure
104. Strain & Keyes, supra note 93, at 107 (reporting that only recently have Rwandans been able to
get news from the ICTR in Kinyarwanda, the national language of Rwanda). See Kritz, Progress and
Humility, supra note 13, at 59 (stating that the victim's groups and local society were long ignored by
the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals, and outreach to the local population on their work took
years to begin). Some progress is currently being made as the ICTR is currently building a courtroom
in Kigali. Id.
105. Victims cannot constitute themselves civil claimants in proceedings before the tribunal. Stef
Vandeginste, Victims of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and War Crimes in Rwanda: The Legal
and Institutional Framework of Their Right to Reparation, in POLITICS AND THE PAST 249, 53 (John
Torpey ed., 2003) [hereinafter Vandeginste, Victims of Genocide]. While the statute of the tribunal
provides for the possibility that reparation in the form of restitution be ordered in the judgments, this
has never happened to date. Id. On the other hand, the ICTR has launched, in 2000, an aid program
for victims, which includes the provision of legal advice, psychological counseling and rieducation, as
well as financial assistance for resettlement. Id. See also David Rawson, Coping with Chaos while
Acting Justly: Lessons from Rwanda, in EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
125, 132 (David Barnhizer ed., 2001) (stating that the ICTR remains "geographically distant and
conceptually estranged from the people it purports to serve").
106. See Ironside, supra note 98, at 36.
107. See Jean De Dieu Mucyo (former Rwandan Minister of Justice), RWANDA AND SOUTH AFRICA
IN DIALOGUE, supra note 81, at 49 (stating that the eradication of impunity was a precondition for
peace). See also Gahima, supra note 100, at 4 (stating that prosecutions were undertaken to address
the victims' demands for justice, issues of accountability and impunity, to foster the rule of law, and to
promote peace and reconciliation).
108. See Cara J. Ferstman, Domestic Trials for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Exam-
ple of Rwanda, 9 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 857, 861 (1997).
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and decimated most of its personnel. 1° 9 According to post-genocide statistics,
over 80 percent of the country's legal personnel-including judges, prosecutors
and magistrates-had either been killed or fled the country following the outbreak
of the violence in April 1994.110 These difficulties were exacerbated by the chal-
lenge of establishing the rule of law in a context where none ever existed in the
first place.'11
With the help of the international community, the Rwandan government
started the rehabilitation and introduced important reforms of the justice system in
a relatively short period of time." 2 Approximately 324 magistrates, 100 deputy
prosecutors and 298 judicial police officers and inspectors were trained prior to
the reopening of the court system in 1996, though these numbers still fell consid-
erably short of what was needed for the system to operate under normal circum-
stances.113 It is in this context that the government of Rwanda proceeded with an
unrealistic program of maximum accountability with the aim of prosecuting all
those responsible for genocide-related crimes, thus assigning to the justice system
an impossible task."14
In 1996, the government passed Organic Law No. 08/96 on the organization
of prosecution for offenses constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against
humanity committed since October 1, 1990.115 The special legislation was con-
ceived "to bring about justice, retribution, and the end of impunity" by setting up
specialized chambers within the ordinary jurisdictions of the first instances courts
to try genocide-related cases.' 16
109. Chris Mburu, Challenges Facing Legal and Judicial Reform in Post-Conflict Environments:
Case Study from Rwanda and Sierra Leone 11, 17-18 (July 8-12, 2001) (paper presented at the World
Bank Conference "Empowerment, Security and Opportunity through Law and Justice") (reporting the
destruction of courthouses and of the most basic legal documents and materials). See William A.
Shabas, Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to
Impossible Problems, CRIM. L.F. 524, 533 (1996). See also Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Con-
current Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DuKE J. OF COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 353 (1997).
110. There are different estimates as to the number of legal personnel present in the country at that
time. See O.A.U. Report, supra note 80, § 18.4 (reporting that there were only five judges in the
country and fifty lawyers). But see Mburu, supra note 109, at 11 (reporting that out of 750 judges in
early 1994, only 244 were left after the genocide; out of 87 prosecutors, 14 were present in post-
genocide Rwanda; out of 193 investigators only 39 survived).
11. See Gahima, supra note 100, at 2 (stating that the pre-genocide justice administration system
was "largely manned by unqualified people ... judges were appointed on the basis of political patron-
age, [and that] corruption in the judiciary was rife"). See also Schabas, supra note 109, at 531 (report-
ing that, in 1993, the Rwandan justice system comprised about seven hundred judges and magistrates,
of whom less than fifty had any formal legal training).
112. Institutional reforms included the establishment of the Supreme Council of Magistrates and the
reestablishment of the Supreme Court, which had been suppressed since 1978. See Amnesty Interna-
tional, Question of Justice, supra note 83, at 12.
113. Id.
114. See Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda's
Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 630 (1998) [hereinafter Drumbl,
Lawlessness].
115. See Organic Law No. 08/96 of Aug. 30, 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses
Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since 1 October 1990,
available at www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter Genocide Law].
116. See Ferstman, supra note 108, at 863 (discussing the Genocide Law).
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The law created four categories of offenses and corresponding punish-
ments.1 1 7 Category 1, which carried the death penalty,1 18 included those who mas-
terminded the genocide (e.g. the planners, instigators, organizers, and leaders of
the genocidal campaign; persons who acted in positions of authority; notorious
murderers; and those who committed particularly heinous acts or sexual tor-
ture).l 9 Category 2, which carried the penalty of life imprisonment" 20 comprised
the perpetrators, conspirators, or accomplices of intentional homicide or serious
assault resulting in death.' 2 1 Category 3, which carried the penalty of imprison-
ment for a number of years,1 22 comprised persons accused of "other serious" but
non-lethal assaults. 123  Category 4 comprised persons who committed offenses
against property 24 and must pay civil damages. 125 The specialized justice pro-
gram established by the Genocide Law also relied heavily on a "fast-track ...
confession procedure."'126  This offered all perpetrators in the genocide-other
than those in Category 1-a substantial sentence reduction subject to a full and
detailed confession, a guilty plea and an apology to the victims. 27 This system
was conceived to accelerate preliminary investigations, speed up and reduce the
number of trials, and enhance reconciliation through public admission of guilt. 1
28
XI. THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE TRIALS: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES IN
DELIVERING JUSTICE
Since their start in 1996, the Rwandan trials for genocide have been subject to
extensive criticism directed at the lack of experience and independence of the
judges, 129 as well as their disregard of due process rights. 30 By the end of 2002,
117. Genocide Law, supra note 115, arts. 2, 14.
118. Id. art. 14.
119. Id. art. 2.
120. Id. art. 14.
121. Id. art. 2.
122. Id. art. 14.
123. Id. art. 2.
124. Id.
125. Id. art. 14(d).
126. See Drumbl, Lawlessness, supra note 114, at 586-87.
127. Genocide Law, supra note 115, arts. 4-16. See Morris, supra note 109, at 359 ("[a] greater
penalty reduction is made available to perpetrators who confess and plead guilty prior to prosecution
than to perpetrators who confess only after prosecution has begun").
128. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda: The ICTR and Na-
tional Trials 51 (1997), at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/rwanda.htm#. See also
Morris, supra note 109, at 360 (commenting that the requirement of a detailed confession was impor-
tant for establishing a "truthful historical record" of the genocide, and in facilitating investigations and
prosecutions of genocide related crimes).
129. When the trial started, most judges in the Specialized Chambers had no trial experience and little
training. See Drumbl, Lawlessness, supra note 114, at 594. See also Ferstman, supra note 108, at 862
(stating that some of the judges presiding over genocide trials were lay persons with only four months
training).
130. See Drumbl, Lawlessness, supra note 114, at 614 (stating that when the trials started in 1996,
only 54 percent of the defendants had defense counsel). See also MtNow, supra note 15, at 124 (argu-
ing that, rather then ending the cycle of revenge, Rwandan trials were revenge). But see United States
Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Rwanda (2001) (reporting that, from
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approximately 7,331 persons had been judged on genocide-related charges, mostly
through group trials. t 31 Although the quality of genocide trials has considerably
improved over time, they are still carried out in a highly charged political context
and by scarcely qualified personnel. 3 2 The judiciary continues to suffer from a
dearth of resources, inefficiency, corruption, and executive influence.' 3  Its "Tut-
sification,"1 34 coupled with the virtual wholesome impunity of the RPF for war
crimes committed during and after the civil war, raises serious questions regarding
its legitimacy and impartiality. 1
35
The credibility of the domestic system of justice is further called into question
by the desperate prison situation in Rwanda. In the aftermath of the genocide, a
massive campaign of arrest associated with a dysfunctional judiciary led to the
unlawful, prolonged detention of thousands of individuals. 136 As of April 2004,
some 80,000 inidividuals were still detained on genocide-related charges. 137 Due
to the overcrowding and the appalling sanitary situation, most prisoners live in life
threatening conditions. 38 This grim situation is not likely to drastically change, as
even the most optimistic estimates indicate a prison population of 60,000 by
2005.139
While the genocide trials have permitted the Rwandan government to indi-
vidualize culpability for the genocide and to send a strong deterrent message to
131. See Amnesty International, Question of Justice, supra note 83, at 16 (estimating that, by the end
of 2001, only 6 percent of genocide suspects had been tried).
132. Id. at 15-16.
133. Id. at 13-14. See also Stef Vandeginste, Rwanda: Dealing with Genocide and Crimes against
Humanity in the Context of Armed Conflict and Failed Political Transition, in BURYING THE PAST:
MAKING PEACE AND DOING JUSTICE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 223, 235 (Nigel Biggar ed., 2001) [here-
inafter Vandeginste, Dealing with Genocide] (reporting that in some cases suspects have been released
by corrupting the judges and that this has led to popular vendetta).
134. See Marc Cousineau, L'etablissement de l'Etat de droit au Rwanda: un but irrealisable, 28
OTrAWA L. REV. 171, 180 (1997) (stating that in 1996, 85 percent of those trained to become magis-
trates were Tutsi). See also Fillip Reyntjens, Chronique Politique du Burundi et du Rwanda, in
L'AFRIQUE DES GRANDS LACS ANNUAIRE 1999-2000, at 112 (F. Reyntjens et S. Marysse ed., 2000)
(reporting that in 1999, the majority of presidents of tribunals of first instance, court of appeals and
Supreme Court were Tutsi, as well as most of the prosecutors); O.A.U Report, supra note 80, § 18.38
(stating that, "as virtually all other sectors of Rwandan public life, the justice system was dominated by
Tutsi").
135. See Strain & Keyes, supra note 93, at 116. See also Press Release, Human Rights Watch,
Rwanda: Deliver Justice for Victims of Both Sides, Aug. 12, 2002 (reporting that thousands were
killed in human rights abuses propagated by the RPF), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/
rwanda081202.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
136. See Amnesty International, Question of Justice, supra note 83, at 6-8. See also Country Report,
supra note 130, § 1 (d) (reporting that, in 2001, ninety-five percent of approximately 110,000 individu-
als detained were awaiting trial on genocide-related charges, the majority of whom had incomplete
files).
137. See Amnesty International, Rwanda: The Enduring Legacy of Genocide and War (Apr. 6, 2004),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr470082004 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) [here-
inafter Amnesty International, Enduring Legacy].
138. See Commission on Human Rights Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda submit-
ted by the Special Representative, Mr. Michel Moussalli, E/CN.4/1999/33, at 30. See also Amnesty
International, Question of Justice, supra note 83, at 8 (reporting 11,000 deaths between 1994 and 2001
due to "preventable disease, malnutrition and the debilitating effects of overcrowding").
139. Peace and Reconciliation in Africa, (Nov. 8-12, 1999) (paper presented at the All-Africa Confer-
ence on African Principles of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) [herein-
after Peace and Reconciliation].
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those convicted, 14° they have failed to achieve other equally important goals. As
observed by Mark Drumbl, "By focusing on individual guilt or innocence in a
situation of broad societal complicity, the importance of collective wrongdoing
and the structural causes of the genocide are ignored, if not negated."14' Accord-
ing to Drumbl, the trials have also strikingly failed to generate feelings of individ-
ual responsibility and guilt among prisoners, with most of them regarding them-
selves simply as prisoners of war ending up on the losing side. 42 This, coupled
with the general distrust of the Tutsi-dominated judicial system, may explain why
the trials have failed to produce a full, reliable record of what happened in 1994,
despite the thousands of criminal prosecutions undertaken by the Rwandan gov-
ernment.143 Further, the slow pace, the inaccessibility of court proceedings, and
lack of reparation through trials have been of little benefit to the victims.' 44 The
Rwandan justice system has thus been deemed to be a "lethargic, and arbitrary
enforcement procedure" that denies justice to alleged perpetrators and victims
alike and hinders the process of reconciliation. 145
XII. SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF JUSTICE: THE GACACA
JURISDICTIONS
Acknowledging the inability of the ordinary justice system to deal with the
sheer number of perpetrators, the Rwandan government started to question the
efficacy of a "Western-style, highly individualized prosecutorial approach" and to
consider alternative ways of overcoming the judicial impasse.146 It thus decided to
introduce Gacaca jurisdictions to try genocide cases. These consist of a commu-
nity-based, highly decentralized system of local courts inspired by the traditional
dispute resolution mechanism existing in Rwanda since pre-colonial time.
4 7
140. Strain & Keyes, supra note 93, at 111 (stating that the trials "brought to justice" those responsi-
ble for the genocide while exonerating those who did not participate in the eye of the state and, more
importantly, of their communities).
141. See Drumbl, Sclerosis, supra note 10, at 295 (arguing that the simplistic categories of "innocent"
or "guilty" created by trials contribute to reinforcing the "dualistic nature" of Rwanda post-genocidal
society).
142. Drumbl, (Al)lure of Genocide Trials, supra note 39, at 227-28. Several observers have noted
that Hutu prisoners usually deny the genocide ever happened and refer to the events taking place be-
tween April and July 1994 as the civil war. Id. at 228.
143. See Drumbl, Sclerosis, supra note 10, at 295 (quoting Carrie Gustafson, International Criminal
Courts: Some Dissident Views on the Continuation of War by the Penal Means, 21 Hous. J. INT'L L.
1, 26 (1998)).
144. See Vandeginste, Dealing with Genocide, supra note 133, at 237 (stating that victims are often
unaware that court hearings are taking place, and that the process of obtaining certificates and of esti-
mating the damage is cumbersome and expensive for them). See also Vandeginste, Victims of Geno-
cide, supra note 105, at 256-57 (although compensation for victims has been awarded in 50 percent of
civil verdicts, in none of these cases were the verdicts awarded against the state or against those found
criminally guilty).
145. Drumbl, Lawlessness, supra note 114, at 600.
146. See Cobban, supra note 84, at 8-10. See also African Rights, Gacaca Justice: A Shared Respon-
sibility 1 (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter African Rights] (estimating that, at the current pace, it will take about
twenty years to complete genocide-related trials).
147. Reyntjens, supra note 134, at 95. According to the government, the new Gacaca jurisdictions
rely on the use of arbitration traditionally embodied in Gacaca to achieve goals of retribution, rehabili-
tation of victims, reconciliation and construction of a "new Rwandan national identity." See Cobban,
supra note 84, at 11 (citing Richard Sezibera, Rwandan Ambassador); Gahima, supra note 100 (speak-
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While the new system was primarily conceived to remedy the slow pace with
which justice was being meted out by the ICTR and the domestic courts, it also
purported to respond to their lack of inclusiveness by engaging individuals and
communities in the process of justice and reconciliation. 148 The Gacaca jurisdic-
tions-which have been promoted by the government as a synthesis of the tradi-
tional Gacaca and a formal, Western-style court system-are expected to have an
approximate lifespan of five to eight years. 149
XIII. THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL GACACA
In its original form, Gacaca is an informal, community-based, localized sys-
tem of dispute resolution that has ancient roots in Rwanda, with origins in pre-
colonial times. 150  Acting as a "local healing . . . mechanism that is cheap and
accessible," Gacaca's indigenous forums are used by villages' inhabitants as an
alternative to the formal state courts to resolve minor disputes arising among
them.151 Gacaca is an expression of the culture and reflects the close-knit nature
of rural communities from which it originated. 152 It operates on an informal, ad
hoc basis, through meetings convened whenever the need arises. 153 Traditionally,
unless women are a party to the conflict, only male adults take part in the meet-
ings which are chaired by respected community elders, acting as arbitrators.
154
Gacaca embodies restorative justice principles because it does not seek to achieve
justice by punishing the perpetrator, but to restore social order by finding commu-
nal, compromised solutions, and by reintegrating the offender within the commu-
nity. 55 As with other African traditional dispute resolution systems, Gacaca aims
ing of "extraordinary laws" to respond to an "extraordinary event"-i.e. the genocide); Rwandan To
Resurrect Traditional Justice System, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 17, 2002, available at www.glo
balpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2002/0617ga.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2004).
148. Strain & Keyes, supra note 93, at 117. See also On a Patch of Grass, THE ECONOMIST, May 17,
2003, at 42 (characterizing Gacaca as "rough, cheap and the main means of Hutu-Tutsi reconcilia-
tion").
149. Genocide Suspects' List to Swell to Over 500,000, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 2, 2004,
available at http://www.hirondelle.orglarusha.nsf/0/4E338483245F4F2D43256FO4005708F8?Open
Document [hereinafter Genocide Suspects' List].
150. See Daly, Punitive and Reconstructive Justice, supra note 76, at 370-71. In many African coun-
tries, colonial powers introduced their own system of courts while allowing indigenous systems of
dispute resolution to continue operating. This resulted in a dual, parallel system of laws and courts
called legal pluralism. Penal Reform International, Access to Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Role
of Traditional and Informal Justice Systems 51 (2000) [hereinafter Access to Justice].
151. See Sarkin, supra note 78, at 159-60.
152. Informal dispute resolution mechanisms generally exist in small, rural communities dominated
by "multiplex relationships," i.e., "relationships which are based on past and future economic and
social dependence, and which intersect ties of kinship." In such communities a dispute between two
individuals is perceived as a conflict belonging to the whole community. See Access to Justice, supra
note 150, at 22.
153. Stef Vandeginste, Justice, Reconciliation and Reparation after Genocide and Crimes against
Humanity: The Proposed Establishment of Popular Gacaca Tribunals in Rwanda (Nov. 8-12, 1999
Addis Ababa) (paper presented to the All Africa Conference on African Principles of Conflict Resolu-
tion and Reconciliation) [hereinafter Vandeginste, Justice]
154. Id. at 15, 17.
155. Id. at 15. See also Peace and Reconciliation, supra note 139, at 7 (stating that arbitrators' deci-
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at restoring peace and social harmony within the community affected by the con-
flict. 156 Although most of the disputes dealt with by Gacaca have a civil nature,
some conflicts amounting to minor criminal offenses are also referred to it, result-
ing not in a criminal sanction but in some sort of civil settlement. 157 Conflicts
dealt with by Gacaca include disputes over land use and land rights, cattle, mar-
riage, inheritance rights, loans, damage to properties or animals, theft, as well as
light bodily injuries. 158 Reflecting its restorative, reconciliatory nature, the sen-
tences it imposes must be accepted by all of the parties involved. 159 In cases
where an agreement between the parties cannot be reached, the case can be re-
ferred to the local "Cantonal Tribunal." Gacaca meetings have over time become
more formalized, being held at regular intervals and with local administrative
authorities sometimes acting as arbitrators in the dispute.' 60  Although most
Gacaca forums ceased to operate during the 1994 genocide, they were reinstated
shortly thereafter and are currently active in many areas of the country.'
6 1
XIV. THE CONTEMPORARY GACACA: BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND
STATE JUSTICE
Faced with the slow pace of justice in the aftermath of the genocide, the
Rwandan government devised a creative solution by reviving and adapting the
traditional Gacaca system of informal dispute resolution to try genocide-related
cases. 16 2 The Gacaca courts are village-based, quasi-judicial forums designed to
complement and remedy the failure of the classical system of justice by achieving
multiple, ambitious goals. 163 These consist of the reduction of delays in the over-
burdened criminal justice system, the uncovering of the truth, and the achievement
of justice and reconciliation through a highly participatory strategy.164 In a unique
way, Gacaca are set to do so by means of retributive and re-integrative measures.
By involving ordinary Rwandans in the process of justice, Gacaca is based on
the assumption that the offenses "were publicly committed before the very eyes of
the population, which thus must recount the facts, disclose the truth and partici-
pate in prosecuting and trying the alleged perpetrators."' 165 Under the new system,
genocide trials take place in the afflicted communities "for whom reconciliation is
156. Access to Justice, supra note 150, at 24.
157. See Fillip Reyntjens, Le Gacaca ou la justice du gazon au Rwanda, 40 POLITIQUE AFRICAINE 34
(1990).
158. Id.
159. See Vandeginste, Justice, supra note 153, at 15.
160. Id. at 16.
161. Jennifer Widener, Courts and Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social Scientist's
Perspective on the African Case, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 66 (2001). See also Access to Justice, supra
note 150, at 78-79.
162. See African Rights, supra note 146, at 1 (stating that the traditional Gacaca system "was shaped
to suit the needs of contemporary Rwanda").
163. On the failures of the formal justice system to deliver justice, see Gahima, supra note 100, at 6
(acknowledging the limited number of Rwandan courts; the cumbersome procedures; the slowness of
the system; the impossibility to participate in the judicial process of the society at large).
164. Manuel Explicatif sur la Loi Organique Portante Creation des Jurisdictions Gacaca 8, Cour
Supreme (Departements de Jurisdictions Gacaca).
165. See Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, at preamble.
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not an abstract goal but a constant daily struggle."' 66 Unlike the formal justice
system and the ICTR, Gacaca jurisdictions operate in the absence of legally quali-
fied judges, prosecutors, and legal counsel. 161
The recourse to the traditional Gacaca as an ad hoc mechanism to comple-
ment the ordinary justice system was first proposed in 1998 by a Commission
largely composed of members of parliament, prefects and representatives of the
Ministry of Justice. 68 Although studies conducted in the phase of conceptualiza-
tion of the Gacaca jurisdictions indicate that they were widely supported by
Rwandans, 169 real understanding about their functioning appeared to be very lim-
ited, with individuals who are the most knowledgeable about the law expressing
skepticism regarding the courts' effectiveness in trying genocide cases.
170
XV. ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION AND POWERS OF THE GACACA
JURISDICTIONS
First adopted by the Rwandan Transitional Assembly in January 2001,'171 the
law devising and regulating the Gacaca courts system was recently amended by
Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 (Gacaca law). 172 Following a two year
pilot phase in which Gacaca courts were established and operated on a circum-
scribed basis, 73 the amended version of the Gacaca law addresses some of the
system's shortcomings by streamlining and simplifying the Gacaca process and by
reducing the overall number of judges involved in it. 174 The Gacaca law estab-
166. See Strain & Keyes, supra note 93, at 118.
167. Amnesty International, Question of Justice, supra note 83, at 37.
168. See Vandeginste, Justice, supra note 153, at 1.
169. According to a survey, conducted in 2000, by a Rwandese NGO, 93 percent of the Rwandese
population was in favor of establishing the Gacaca jurisdictions to try genocide related cases and
considered them to be the appropriate instrument to promote national reconciliation. See Special
Gacaca, LE VERDICT No. 15/16, July 2000. But see Sarkin, supra note 78, at 160 (reporting that at
least one group, the Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda, has rejected the
Gacaca courts); Vandengiste, Justice, supra note 153, at 14 (reporting that a sociological enquiry
conducted in 1996 indicated that people generally rejected the use of traditional Gacaca to deal with
the genocide cases).
170. See S. GABISIREGE & S. BABALOLA, PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE GACACA LAW IN RWANDA:
EVIDENCE FROM A MULTI-METHOD STUDY 11 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Sch. of Public Health, Center for
Communications Programs 2001).
171. Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001, supra note 3 (setting up the "Gacaca jurisdictions" and
organizing prosecutions for offenses constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity
committed between Oct. 1, 1990 and Dec. 31, 1994).
172. Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4 (establishing the organization, competence
and functioning of Gacaca courts charged with prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of
genocide and other crimes against humanity, committed between Oct. 1, 1990 and Dec. 31, 1994).
173. See Hirondelle News Agency, Gacaca Tribunals Officially Launched in Rwanda, June 24, 2004
(reporting that the 751 Gacaca courts involved in the pilot phase have so far collected information on
the genocide in their respective communities, classified the alleged perpetrators, and completed lists of
the victims), available at http://hirondelle.org/arusha.nsf/English?OpenFrameSet (last visited Oct. 24,
2004).
174. The June 2004 amendments reduced the overall number of Gacaca judges from 258,209 to
169,400; reduced the number of judges on each Gacaca bench from 19 to 9; eliminated the two highest
levels of Gacaca courts as established by Organic Law No.40/200 of 26/01/2001, namely those at the
district and the province level; and introduced measures to protect the identity of rape victims. See
IRIN News, Rwanda: Traditional Courts Inaugurated, June 24, 2004, available at www.irinnews.org/
[Vol. 2
24
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2004, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2004/iss2/2
Rwandan Gacaca
lishes a hierarchical system of "Gacaca courts" in the country's two lowest admin-
istrative units-notably the cell and the sector-and introduces a Gacaca court of
appeal in each sector.1 ' 5 The Gacaca courts are supervised and coordinated by the
newly established National Service. 176 The new law classifies genocide suspects
into three categories according to the degree of their responsibility and the seri-
ousness of the crimes they committed, and confers on the Gacaca courts the com-
petence to try middle-low level suspects in Categories 2 and 3.'77 Category 2
includes perpetrators and accomplices of homicide and other serious attacks caus-
ing death; those who injured or attempted to kill their victims; as well as those
who committed assaults without the intention to kill. 78 Category 3 includes those
suspected of having committed offenses against property. 79  Category 1 sus-
pects-which includes the instigators and organizers of the genocide, notorious
murderers, rapists and those who committed acts of torture against their victims-
will continue to be tried by the ordinary courts.' 80 General assemblies at the cell
and sector level (composed of all adult residents in the respective communities)
elect nine adults of "integrity" from within themselves to serve as "judges" in the
Gacaca courts, and five deputies.'18 Gacaca judges are not required to possess any
legal qualifications. 82 The Gacaca courts combine the powers of the prosecution
and of the ordinary tribunals. At the cell level, the general assembly exercises the
functions of a prosecutor: it identifies the crimes, the victims, the alleged perpetra-
tors and gives evidence to the bench. 83  On the basis of this information, the
bench compiles lists of the cell's residents, victims, and suspects; gathers evidence
and testimonies; makes all necessary investigations; and receives confessions,
guilty pleas and apologies. 84 In order to conduct hearings, Gacaca jurisdictions
are vested with powers similar to those conferred upon ordinary criminal tribu-
nals.185 Gacaca benches at the cell level determine the categorization of all sus-
report.asp?ReportID=41860 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) [hereinafter IRIN News, Traditional Courts
Inaugurated].
175. Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, arts. 3-4. Each Gacaca court is composed
of three organs: a General Assembly, a Seat (or bench), and a Coordination Committee. See id. art. 5.
176. Id. art. 50.
177. Id. art. 2. A previous version of the Gacaca law classified genocide suspects into four categories
in accordance with the 1996 Genocide Law (Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30, 1996), and con-
ferred on the Gacaca courts the task to try Category 2-4 suspects. See Organic Law No. 40/2000 of
26/01/2001, supra note 3, art. 51.
178. Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, art. 51(2).
179. Id. art. 51(3).
180. Id. art. 51(1).
181. Id. art. 13. The General Assembly for the Sector level elects, within itself, nine persons of
integrity and their five deputies to make up the Seat both of the Gacaca court of appeal, and of the
Gacaca court of the sector. See also id. art. 8.
182. See id. art. 14. According to this provision, Rwandans of "integrity" who are at least twenty-one
years of age can be elected as Gacaca judges under condition that they have not participated in the
genocide; are free from the spirit of "sectarianism"; have not been sentenced to a penalty of at least six
months of imprisonment; are of high morals and conduct, truthful and honest; and are characterized by
a spirit of speech sharing.
183. Id. art. 33. See also Daly, Punitive and Reconstructive Justice, supra note 76, at 373.
184. Id. art. 34.
185. See id. art. 39. Benches at the cell level may compel testimony, order searches, take temporary
protective measures against the property of those accused of genocide, sentence the convicted person
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pects who lived in the cell during the genocide; try suspects of the least serious
crimes, those against property (Category 3 suspects); and forward Category 1 and
2 suspects' files to, respectively, the public prosecutor and Gacaca courts at the
sector level. 5 6 Category 2 suspects are tried by the sector-level Gacaca courts. 87
The Gacaca law offers strong sentence reductions as an incentive to confess, and
the possibility to commute half of the defendant's sentence into community ser-
vice. 188 Gacaca hearings are public, except for rape related proceedings and other
exceptional cases in which hearings are conducted in camera. 89 The Gacaca law
prescribes penalties for individuals who refuse to testify and for those who have
threatened or otherwise exercised illicit forms of pressure on witnesses. 190 The
Gacaca jurisdictions can impose sentences as severe as thirty years of imprison-
ment for Category 2 defendants who have killed or attempted to kill their victims
and refuse to confess, whereas Category 3 defendants can only be ordered to pay
civil compensation for damages to victims' property.191 Under the law, there is a
limited right of appeal only for Category 2 defendants; a right to present opposi-
tion against a sentence for those against whom the latter has been pronounced in
absentia; and a right to obtain review of a judgment in circumscribed cases. 192
The new system started to be implemented throughout Rwanda in June 2004,
following a two-year pilot phase that involved 751 of the nation's 9,010 Gacaca
jurisdictions. 193 After considerable delays on the initial government's timeline,
thousands of cases are now ready to be tried by the 169,400 popularly elected
judges. 194
XVI. A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW GACACA JURISDICTIONS: PROSPECTS AND
CHALLENGES
The new Gacaca jurisdictions represent an innovative, attractive blend be-
tween retributive and restorative justice. While acknowledging that, to a certain
extent, justice in the form of punishment is indispensable to help victims come to
terms with the past, the participatory and restorative nature of the Gacaca process
186. Id. art. 34(6)(7)(9)(10). See also id. art. 41.
187. Id. arts. 36(4), 42.
188. Id. art. 73. Confessions can be made at any stage during the proceedings. Sentence reductions
are greatest when the confession is done before the name of the suspect appears on the list of accused
compiled by Gacaca benches at the cell level. For example, Category 2 suspects accused of murder or
attempted murder who do not confess incur a prison sentence ranging from twenty-five to thirty years
of imprisonment; this sentence is reduced to twelve to fifteen years in case of confession after the
name of the accused appears on the list, down to seven to twelve years where the confession is made
prior to the appearance of the name on the list of accused persons. Id.
189. Id. arts. 38, 21.
190. See id. arts. 29, 30. According to art. 29, every Rwandan citizen has a "duty to participate" in
Gacaca courts activities, and persons who omit or refuse to testify can be prosecuted by Gacaca courts
and be sentenced to up to one year imprisonment. Id. art. 29.
191. Id. arts. 73-74. If the author of the offense and the victim have reached an amicable settlement,
either privately or before the public authority or other witnesses, prosecution of the former is banned.
See id., art. 51.
192. Id. art. 85.
193. See IRIN News, Traditional courts Inaugurated, supra note 174.
194. According to some sources, Gacaca trials are scheduled to begin in January 2005. See Hiron-
delle News Agency, Beginning of Gacaca trials moved to 2005, Sept. 21, 2004, available at http://fr.
allafica.com/stories/200409210921.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
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makes it an instrument potentially suitable to uncover the truth and foster sustain-
able peace and reconciliation in the long term. While laudable, both goals are
fraught with challenges.
XVH. GACACA JURISDICTIONS AS ACCESSIBLE, PARTICIPATORY,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
In the face of divisive genocide trials that have prolonged the determination
of accountability, Gacaca holds the promises of a system geared towards societal
justice and reconciliation.' 95
The new system presents the advantage of dispensing with many of the cum-
bersome, time-consuming procedures and formalities characterizing conventional
trials. 196 Its functioning does not require the intervention of qualified, professional
lawyers and judges, but instead relies exclusively on lay judges with a minimum
of training, and the communities they represent. 197 The extensive network of
Gacaca courts throughout the country makes it possible for the bulk of genocide
trials to be held on a large scale and in several places simultaneously.
198
Procedural simplicity and the speedy disposal of cases may appease the quest
for justice of genocide victims and suspects alike because it would send the mes-
sage that justice is being done. For the rural communities most affected by the
genocide, the highly decentralized system of local courts seems to remedy the
feeling of alienation caused by geographic distance, technicalities, and lack of
communication vis-A-vis the genocide trials conducted to date by the ICTR and
the specialized chambers. 199 From the suspects' view, those who have been
locked up in horrible prisons for years will at last appear before a jury of their
195. Strain & Keyes, supra note 93, at 118.
196. Daly, Punitive and Reconstructive Justice, supra note 76, at 375 (generally discussing the Janu-
ary 2001 version of the Gacaca law. The same observations apply to the 2004 amended version of the
Gacaca law).
197. See id.
198. Id. By introducing Gacaca courts and decentralizing the process of justice, the Rwandan gov-
ernment had initially hoped to drastically reduce the court caseload, the enormous prison population,
and to speed up the trials. According to initial government estimates, with the operation of Gacaca,
approximately 110,000 prisoners would have been turned over from the formal justice system to the
new courts. See RWANDA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN DIALOGUE, supra note 81, at 42. These predictions
have soon proven to be unrealistic, and there are currently widespread concerns, among the govern-
ment and observers alike, about the "multiplying effect" that the Gacaca process might have on the
number of genocide cases. See Genocide Suspects' List, supra note 149 (reporting that, contrary to
initial government estimates, the number of suspects might increase from about 100,000 to 500,000-
600,000 as a result of the Gacaca process. Out of this number, some 50,000 are expected to be tried by
the ordinary courts. Despite these estimates, the Rwandan government still maintains that all genocide
trials will be completed in a period between five and eight years).
According to a 2004 report by Amnesty International, the 32,000 confessions received by the Ministry
of Justice by the end of 2002 incriminated an additional 250,000 individuals. See Amnesty Interna-
tional, Enduring Legacy, supra note 137. As of March 2004, there have been 32,000 additional con-
fessions, likely to implicate many more individuals. Id. Finally, the few Gacaca courts that have
operated during the pilot phase have also identified thousands of new genocide suspects, foreshadow-
ing a "logistical nightmare" that Gacaca will most likely be unable to tackle. Id. See also Lars Wal-
dorf, Human Rights Watch Country Representative for Rwanda, Panel Discussion at the presentation
of the film "Gacaca: Living Together again," Washington, D.C., (June 3, 2003) (estimating that
100,000 to 250,000 new incriminations may possibly follow the introduction of gacaca).
199. See Ironside, supra note 98, at 48-49.
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peers, rather than having to face courts deemed to be the expression of victor's
justice.200 Further, the Gacaca law introduces the possibility for victims to obtain
reparation for the harm suffered in the form of compensation by allowing them
civil intervention in the course of Gacaca proceedings, while at the same time
acknowledging their status as victims.
20
Aside from dramatically increasing access to justice for all parties involved,
the Gacaca jurisdictions hold the promises of other important goals. The new
state-mandated jurisdictions are characterized by an appealing, highly participa-
tory approach, where participation is seen as the only sustainable way to achieve
202longer-term peace and societal transformation. Despite being a state creation,
the new system delegates as much power as possible to ordinary people in their
communities, a fact that may enhance the trust people have in the process and its
outcomes. 203 The trials indeed take place "at the heart of the community, ' ' 2°4 with
ordinary Rwandans actively involved in the process by electing and acting as
judges, collecting and processing information, and gathering evidence in what is a
collectively shared and experienced search for justice and truth. 20 5 Similar to what
has been observed for the South African TRC, it is the process that matters, not
just the result. Public hearings that gather the testimony of perpetrators and vic-
tims alike become crucial both "as communal experiences and as sources of in-
,206formation." Reflecting its restorative approach, truth in Gacaca emerges com-
municatively in a dialogue involving all community members, including victims,
offenders, supporters and other interested parties. Importantly, victims and survi-
vors of unspeakable crimes are potentially given the opportunity to play a central
200. Id. at 50.
201. On the right to reparation under Gacaca, see Vandeginste, Victims of Genocide, supra note 105,
at 258, 263 (referring to the task conferred upon Gacaca judges of determining the damages to be
awarded in each judgment in accordance with a scale foreseen under the law creating the Compensa-
tion Fund). The Fund will be responsible for the implementation of this part of the verdict, and will be
financed by annual contribution from the state budget, as well as voluntary contributions from foreign
countries and profit from community service work. Id. Compensation will be made either in cash or
through actions and interventions to benefit the beneficiary. Id. In 1998, a National Fund for Assis-
tance to Survivors of Genocide was also established with the task to assist the most vulnerable survi-
vors. Id. This measure has mostly proven ineffective due to instances of misappropriation and embez-
zlement involving the fund's administrators. Id.
202. Strain & Keyes, supra note 93, at 121. See Daly, Transformative Justice, supra note 27, at 178-
79 (stating that Gacaca has the potential to transform the Rwandan society because it addresses the
very deficiencies in the country's social and political fabric that allowed the genocide to happen).
According to Daly, "Whereas that society was characterized by a highly centralized administration, the
gacaca process will be localized. Law [then virtually absent] will make its comeback in a highly
feasible and accessible way... [with] people ... control[ling] the process and the outcome." Id. See
also Ironside, supra note 98, at 49 (observing that the new Gacaca, unlike its original form, provides
also for the participation of women, many of whom were elected as judges). This is particularly im-
portant given that women have suffered the heaviest repercussions as a result of the genocide. Id.
203. Daly, Punitive and Reconstructive Justice, supra note 76, at 376-77 (stating that, "Rwandans of
all stations will literally be defining justice . . . rather than having it defined for and imposed on
them"). See also Harrell, supra note 10, at 60 (observing that the greater legitimacy of local forums is
likely to be pronounced in dualist postgenocidal societies, which are frequently suspicious of the
central government).
204. African Rights, supra note 146, at 2.
205. See Daly, Punitive and Reconstructive Justice, supra note 76, at 376.
206. MINOW, supra note 15, at 127-28 (discussing benefits of truth commissions). See Vandeginste,
Victims of Genocide, supra note 105, at 260-61 (describing the participatory nature of Gacaca process
as amounting to a form of reparation both for victims of the genocide and their communities).
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role in Gacaca, challenging those who inflicted pain upon them. Community dia-
logue may also provide an opportunity to affirm and discuss-and perhaps
change-societal norms in a public and participatory setting, even in a context
where "social relations and acted-out values have been massively distorted. 2 °7
This is critically important in Rwanda, where the "moral tone of the community"
has been tainted by widespread and horrendous crimes. 208 In Rwanda the violence
did not arise out of anarchic chaos, but was largely driven by the shared convic-
tion, fostered by the government's propaganda of ethnic hatred, that the Tutsi had
to be eliminated for the country to become a better place. 2°
Holding trials at the local, grassroots level empowers ordinary people to pur-
sue justice, and could encourage the perpetrators-who are judged by their peers
and within their communities-to contribute to the search for truth, with a poten-
tially "cathartic ... effect on fragmented communities.', 2 10 For those who confess
to, and acknowledge, their crimes before Gacaca, community shaming may have
potential re-integrative effects, given the interdependence and close-knit nature of
the Rwandan community. 21 1 Unlike the South African experience with the TRC,
confessions in Gacaca need to be accompanied not only by full disclosure of the
facts, but also by an apology to the victims, thus possibly helping them to achieve
a sense of closure.212
The restorative aspects of Gacaca enable perpetrators of the genocide "to
make amends for their actions in a way that establishes a human relationship be-
tween them, victims and others in the community." 213 Returning perpetrators to
face shaming by their own communities, communities made up not only by vic-
tims, perpetrators and their respective supporters, but also by those who opposed,
or were ambivalent about, the violence, may exercise a considerable pressure on
214the perpetrators and thus deter recidivism. It may also promote moral education
of the perpetrators and their communities. Taking these individuals back to de-
stroyed communities, and confronting them with the harm they have inflicted,
thus humanizing it, may further break down the widespread societal complicity
while preventing future violence.2 15 Although this process may not always beeasy or possible, it may still be more effective than criminal trials, the main result
207. Stovel, supra note 40, at 9.
208. Id. (reporting that First National healing circles in Hollow Water, Manitoba, led to the detection
and acknowledgment of widespread social abuse within the community and to the latter capacity to
address the problem and reaffirm positive values).
209. See Drumbl, (Al)lure of Genocide Trials, supra note 39, at 220.
210. Ironside, supra note 98, at 49 (stating that "by bringing victims and perpetrators face to face to
tell their stories [Gacaca] will ... create moral pressure on perpetrators to confess to their crimes and
seek forgiveness" and that "the confession itself will be an important source of justice for victims").
See also Daly, Punitive and Reconstructive Justice, supra note 76, at 376 (stating that trials by the
Gacaca jurisdictions may "replace the divisive experience of the genocide with the cohesive experience
of securing justice").
211. See Drumbl, (Al)lure of Genocide Trials, supra note 39, at 222-23.
212. See Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, art. 54 (requiring those resorting to
the "procedure of confession, guilty plea, repentance and apologies" to address apologies "publicly" to
the victims in case they are still alive and to the Rwandan society).
213. Stovel, supra note 40, at 7 (generally referring to restorative justice benefits for offenders).
214. Drumbl, (Al)lure of Genocide Trials, supra note 39, at 222-23 (discussing John Braithwaite's
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of which seems to be to encourage prisoners' persecutory feelings, far from creat-
ing any remorse or shame for what they have done. Instilling shame on offenders,
rather than imposing guilt on them, may in turn fortify communities, favoring
peace and reconciliation in the long term.
By potentially encouraging participants to reveal more contextual information
than conventional trials do, Gacaca may also well contribute to establish an his-
torical record of the genocide and its causes well beyond the imperfect, partial
versions of truth furnished by the ICTR and the specialized chambers. 216 "Infor-
mation that would be ruled irrelevant in legalistic criminal trials [may potentially
be] very relevant for healing victims, offenders, and their communities, and [for]
addressing the social or systemic conditions that led to, or enabled the [genocide
to happen]." 2t 7 This truth may be passed on from generation to generation within
each and every community, replacing partisan versions of the same tragedy.
While, in the most optimistic scenario, Gacaca will involve the entire community
in truth-telling, shaming of perpetrators, and broad discussion about the underly-
ing causes of the genocide-in the least, and despite its potential failure-it may
uncover the truth in individual situations.
2 1
8
Unlike trials before the ICTR and the specialized chambers, Gacaca is explic-
itly designed to achieve reconciliation. 2 9 This is crucial, given that Rwanda is a
"dualist post-genocidal society," one in which victims and aggressors must un-
avoidably coexist, living geographically intermingled and in close economic in-
terdependence. 220 It is also important in the face of trials that are seen as exasper-
ating social division and prolonging the determination of accountability. By
bringing justice at the local level-which is where the most people, especially in
the rural communities, experienced the genocidal violence-justice becomes visi-
ble, by facilitating a process of coming to terms with the past through the emer-
gence of truth. 221 This in turn, may favor the minimum indispensable degree of
reconciliation necessary for communities to continue to coexist, in a context
where reconciliation is not an option, but a necessity.2 2 If successful, the maxi-
mum involvement of individuals would not only make them contribute to a proc-
ess of "national and historical significance ... but could also strengthen commu-
nity ties by fostering mutual cooperation. ' 223
Gacaca provides both moral and practical incentives for perpetrators to con-
fess their crimes and seek forgiveness, as well as the ability to flexibly fashion
216. See Strain & Keyes, supra note 93, at 125 (observing that, despite the informal nature of Gacaca,
its truth-telling aspect cannot be underestimated in a country with an important oral tradition). The
Rwandan government hopes that Gacaca trials will help find out how many died in the genocide with
more accuracy. See IRIN, Rwanda: Census finds 937,000 died in genocide, April 2, 2004, available
at www.allafrica.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
217. Stovel, supra note 40, at 9 (discussing benefits of restorative justice).
218. See Drumbl, Sclerosis, supra note 10, at 301.
219. Strain & Keyes, supra note 93, at 125.
220. Drumbl, (Al)lure of Genocide Trials, supra note 39, at 220.
221. Idi T. Gaparayi, Justice and Social Reconstruction in the Aftermath of Genocide in Rwanda: An
Evaluation of the Possible Role of the Gacaca Tribunals, 1 AFR. H.R. L.J., 78, 104 (2001).
222. Daly, Transformative Justice, supra note 27, at 168-69 (arguing that it is at the local level that
the hard work of reconciliation needs to be done, and that it is up to the communities to "make sense of
what happened" and to find a way of leaving together again).
223. Id. at 177.
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sentences and remedies. Category 2 suspects who confess can in fact choose to
spend half of a considerably reduced sentence by performing community ser-
vice.225 This will include administrative tasks, maintenance of public buildings,
construction of schools, roads, and community buildings, crop cultivation, educa-
tion, and first aid activities.226 Again, performing activities in the interest of vic-
tims and the community as a whole may provide perpetrators with an opportunity
to compensate the victim and others harmed for the damage done, as well as fa-
227
cilitate their gradual reintegration into the community.
XVIII. DUE PROCESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS
Far from embodying a pure restorative philosophy, Gacaca also delivers jus-
tice in its most traditional form, through punishment and retribution. Because of
this, it has been extensively criticized by some human rights observers on the
ground that it restricts international fair trial standards that the Rwandan govern-
ment is bound to respect under the international and regional conventions it has
ratified. 28 Such standards, it is argued, should apply to the Gacaca jurisdictions
for a combination of reasons. First, despite the participation of lay judges, Gacaca
courts have been created through state legislation and are vested with many of the
same powers as ordinary courts (including trying cases as serious as murder and
imposing severe criminal sentences); second, they are called upon to apply state
legislation; third, enforcement of decisions and supervision of the Gacaca courts is
carried out through the state machinery.229 Some observers have expressed fears
that, as currently conceived, Gacaca will amount to an "exedited criminal justice
process ... without the requisite due process safeguards.", The lack of respect
of fair trial standards could arguably weaken the very democratic foundation of
the system by undermining its legitimacy and credibility.
X[X. COMPETENCE, INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY OF GACACA
JUDGES
The right to be tried by a "competent, independent and impartial tribunal es-
tablished by law" is guaranteed under the International Covenant on Civil and
224. See Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, arts. 72-73. Category 1 suspects who
choose to confess and apologize can see their death or life imprisonment sentence commuted into long
prison terms, see id. art. 72. See also Drumbl, Sclerosis, supra note 10, at 301.
225. See Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, arts. 51, 73.
226. See Vandeginste, Victims of Genocide, supra note 105, at 261.
227. Id. (describing aspects of the draft presidential decree foreseeing the creation of Committees for
Community Service at the national, provincial and local level).
228. See Press Release, Amnesty International United Kingdom, Rwanda: Gacaca Tribunals Must
Conform With International Fair Trial Standards (Dec. 17, 2002), available at www.amnesty org.uk/
news/press/14258.shtml (last visited Oct. 24, 2004); Leah Werchick, Prospects for Justice in Rwanda's
Citizens Tribunals, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 15 (2001) (generally arguing that the use of Gacaca tribunals to
try genocide cases as envisaged in a 1999 government's proposal violated both domestic and intema-
tional due process guarantees).
229. See Gaparayi, supra note 221, at 95; Vandeginste, Justice, supra note 153, at 25.
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Political Rights (ICCPR)231' and the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights.232 It is an "absolute right, suffering no exceptions. 233 Internal standards
articulating such rights require that those who perform judicial functions be se-
lected on the basis of their integrity and ability, and that they have appropriate
training or qualifications in law. 4 Although the Gacaca lay judges have been
subject to six days of intensive training on a variety of subjects, both the quality
and duration of the training have been criticized as being inadequate and insuffi-
cient in view of the difficult functions they are called to exercise. 35 Gacaca
judges are indeed expected to interpret and apply state legislation, to pronounce
judgments in complex and sensitive cases, and to impose harsh sentences involv-
23ing long prison terms. 36 Categorization of the accused (including Category 1
defendants, liable to the death penalty) is made at the lowest gacaca court level-
237the cell-where most of the judges are illiterate. Trainees have also not been
provided with basic resources and materials, such as the Gacaca law and explica-
tive materials, and the training has not covered fundamental topics, such as those
of compensation and community service either.238
Serious concerns also exist regarding the actual independence and impartial-
ity of the Gacaca judges. As stated by the Honorable Sandra Oxner, "[J]udicial
independence is about personal integrity and about institutions and mechanisms
put in place to create an environment best suited for personal integrity to flour-
ish. 239 In its articulation, this concept encompasses such diverse things as an
adequate salary, "substantive" or "decisional" independence in making decisions
without pressure from external sources-being it state organs, litigants, or the
powerful-and "institutional" or "collective" independence of the judicial body as
a whole, i.e. administrative and financial independence. 240  Impartiality, on the
231. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 14(1) (Rwanda acceded on Apr. 16, 1975).
232. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights, June 26, 1981, 21 LL.M. 58, arts. 7(1),
27.
233. Gonzalez del Rio v. Peru (263/1987), Oct. 28, 1992, Report of the Human Rights Committe, vol.
II, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/48/48/1993 (1993).
234. United Nations, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, at Principle 10, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985) [hereinafter Basic Principles]. Although such principles are not
legally binding, they represent authoritative interpretations of states' due process obligations under
international law.
235. The training was held between April and May 2002 and covered matters such as basic principles
of law, group management, conflict resolution, judicial ethics, trauma, human resources, equipment
and financial management. See Amnesty International, Question of Justice, supra note 83, at 27. See
also African Rights, supra note 146, at 4-9 (reporting that trainers who included judges, human rights
defenders, second year law students and government officials, had been trained themselves for ten
days, and were each assigned a group of fifty to seventy trainees).
236. Gaparayi, supra note 221, at 90.
237. See African Rights, supra note 146, at 5-6 (commenting that, since the Department of Gacaca
courts did not expect illiterate judges, the training was not designed to take their special needs into
account).
238. Id. at 4-5, 9.
239. Sandra Oxner, The Quality of Judges § 4 (July 8-12, 2001) (paper presented at the World Bank
Conference "Empowerment, Security and Opportunity through Law and Justice," Saint Petersburg).
240. Id. § 3. See also Basic Principles, supra note 233, at Principle 2. "The judiciary shall decide
matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without improper
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other hand, requires that judges (professional or lay judges) 241 be free of bias or
prejudice in each individual case.242 The Gacaca law requests that all Gacaca
judges be "Rwandans of integrity ... free from the spirit of sectarianism ... of
high morals and conduct ... [and] honest., 243 It further establishes that they be
removed from their functions in cases where they encourage "sectarianism" or
have performed acts "incompatible with the quality of a person of integrity."
' 244
Grounds of incompatibility of the role of a judge with some professions are also
established by the law. 245 Finally, both the secret nature of judges' deliberations,
and the exclusion of judges from cases involving defendants to whom they are
246related or with whom there is a relationship of enmity or friendship, should also
guarantee their independence. However, despite such provisions, both the unique
magnitude of the offenses committed, and the polarized nature of Rwandan soci-
ety, pose serious challenges to the integrity of the most well-intentioned judges.
Given the broad-based perpetration of genocidal violence, it is likely that most
judges could be related to the victims in particular cases, compromising their im-
partiality in judging the suspects. 24 7
Dangers related to the actual lack of impartiality and independence of the
Gacaca courts do not only reflect on the defendants, but also on the victims.
Communities that are predominantly Hutu, for instance, might very well favor
defendants even where they have allegedly committed atrocities.248 In general,
there is a risk that, as they are currently conceived, Gacaca jurisdictions will repli-
cate and amplify, "local political or ethnic dynamics [and may therefore] favor
victims or the accused accordingly., 249 Given the ongoing ethnic and political
tension and the resulting strong polarization of the Rwandese communities, issues
of lack of independence and impartiality may be seen as pervading the whole
system, raising concerns as to the overall fairness and legitimacy of Gacaca tri-
als.250
Finally, there are material factors that may pose a risk to the judge's inde-
pendence. Gacaca judges are indeed expected to exercise their functions without
perceiving any form of remuneration, despite the risks and the level of commit-
241. Communication 387/1989, Karttunen v. Finland, Decision of Oct. 23, 1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
46/D/387/1989 (1992).
242. Basic Principles, supra note 233, at Principle 2.
243. Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, art. 14. Elected judges must be at least
twenty-one years old and, in addition to other requirements, must not have participated in perpetrating
offenses constituting genocide or crimes against humanity. Id.
244. Id. art. 16(3), 16(6).
245. See id. art. 15. Judges cannot be: state officials; persons exercising political activities; active
members of the national police or the army; members of religious groups and governmental organiza-
tions; or career magistrates. See id. art. 15.
246. Id. arts. 10, 21.
247. Ironside, supra note 98, at 52-53.
248. Id. at 55.
249. Id. at 52. See also Sarkin, supra note 78, at 161 (quoting Alison des Forges, "the fairness of the
proceedings will vary enormously... [and] the result in any one community will be determined by the
local balance of power").
250. Amnesty International, Question of Justice, supra note 83, at 37. Appearance of independence
relates to the question of whether litigants have a legitimate doubt about the tribunal's independence,
thus affecting the confidence that the courts must inspire in a democratic society. See Gaparayi, supra
note 221, at 92.
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ment that this implies.2 5 1 This has been seriously criticized by external observers
and the judges alike, as it may compromise their independence and integrity by
making them susceptible to corruption.252
XX. RIGHT TO DEFENSE
The procedural simplicity characterizing the Gacaca jurisdictions denies the
very principle of equality of arms in criminal cases in several ways that favor the
prosecution.253 First, the Gacaca law does not entitle defendants to be represented
by a lawyer, contrary to international fair trial standards.25 4 It only provides an
opportunity for the defendant to speak for himself, and for individuals at the hear-
ings to speak for or against the defendant.255 This may be problematic, as the
majority of defendants have a low educational background and very limited, if
any, awareness of their rights.256
The Rwandan government purports that the nature of Gacaca as a community
257forum ensures a procedurally equal position for both plaintiff and defendant.
According to this interpretation "the defense will be based on facts, possibly with
the help of people giving evidence for the defense. The judges, not being jurists
themselves, will not be bogged down with complicated principles of procedure.
The accused, the judge, and witnesses, are on equal footing, and recourse to pro-
fessional lawyers will merely upset the balance. 25 8
The defendant's position may be further compromised by the fact that the ma-
jority of cases will be judged on the basis of the files prepared and handed over to
the Gacaca judges by the public prosecutor's offices, making it difficult for lay
judges and defendants-both of whom lack legal skills-to challenge the informa-
tion contained in them. 259 The position of the defendant may be further compro-
mised by the fact that Gacaca courts may, whenever necessary, be assisted by
legal experts appointed by the National Service 26 whom, by virtue of their legal
qualifications, may exercise considerable influence over the Gacaca judges. De-
fendants who choose not to confess are particularly vulnerable, as Gacaca courts
can hear evidence from the public prosecutor. 26' Finally, defendants do not have
251. See Gacaca Jurisdictions, supra note 2 (stressing the difficulties faced by judges in administer-
ing justice in highly traumatized communities still deeply divided by mistrust, and the multiple sources
of community pressure they are subject to-i.e. by the perpetrators, the survivors and their families).
See also African Rights, supra note 146, at 14 (reporting that, despite early government promises, the
Gacaca law does not provide for any compensation).
252. Id.
253. See Amnesty International, Question of Justice, supra note 83, at 32, 36-37 (discussing the
implications of such principle).
254. The right to defense includes the right to defend oneself in person or through a lawyer. Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, art.14 (3)(d); African Charter, art. 7(1).
255. Organic Iaw No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, arts. 64-65, 68.
256. See Gaparayi, supra note 221, at 97.
257. Amnesty International, Question of Justice, supra note 83, at 36.
258. Jean de Dieu Mucyo (former Rwandan Minister of Justice), Gacaca Courts and Genocide, in
RWANDA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN DIALOGUE, supra note 81, at 53.
259. See Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, arts. 46(3), 47. See also Amnesty
International, Question of Justice, supra note 83, at 36.
260. See Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, art. 26.
261. Id. art. 65(5)(c).
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access to their case file prior to the hearings, and will not be able to present wit-
nesses in their defense nor to cross-examine witnesses.262
XXI. RIGHT TO REVIEW BY A HIGHER TRIBUNAL
Under international fair trial standards, individuals convicted of a crime are
entitled to have their conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher competent and
impartial tribunal according to procedures established by law. 263 The Gacaca law
provides for three means of appeal: opposition, appeal, and review of judgments
passed by Gacaca courts. 264 While opposition can be made by defendants against
judgments pronounced by any Gacaca court in their absence,265 only Category 2
defendants have the right to appeal their sentence to the Gacaca court of appeal.266
Judgments relating to offenses against property are not subject to appeal.2 7 While
the original Gacaca law allowed defendants to appeal their categorization before
the Gacaca jurisdiction competent to try their case, this possibility no longer
seems to be provided for by the amended version of the law.268
Review of judgments pronounced by Gacaca courts are allowed in the follow-
ing cases: when an individual was acquitted in a judgment passed in the last resort
by an ordinary court, but is later found guilty by a Gacaca court; when an individ-
ual was convicted by an ordinary court, but is later found innocent by a Gacaca
court; when the sentence pronounced against a defendant contradicts the legal
provisions of the offenses for which he is convicted. 269 The Gacaca court of ap-
peal is competent to review such judgments. The fact that no appeal can ever be
made to the ordinary courts is particularly troubling in the case of Category 2
defendants, some of whom are liable to severe sentences involving long prison
terms. As it has been observed, "[b]y containing all hearings and appeals within.
Gacaca... concerns about the absence of fair trial guarantees pervade the en-
tire system. 27 °
262. Id. arts. 64-66, 68 (describing Gacaca hearings and judgments). While defendants are allowed to
"comment on the accusations" made against them, "respond to the plaintiff's declarations," and "an-
swer questions" put to them by "any person taking the floor," no explicit reference is made to a right of
defendants to cross-examine witnesses or present witnesses in their defense. Id. See also Ironside,
supra note 98, at 54.
263. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
264. See Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, Chap. VI, arts. 85-93.
265. Id. arts. 4143, 86-88.
266. Id. arts. 43, 89-91. Judgments passed by the Gacaca court of the sector in the first instance are
appealed before the Gacaca court of appeal which gives a ruling in the last resort. Id.
267. Id. arts. 41, 89. However, other judgments pronounced by the Gacaca court of the cell-such as
those pronounced in cases involving tampering of witnesses-are subject to appeal before the Gacaca
court of the sector. Id. art. 89.
268. Compare Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001, supra note 3, art. 86, with Organic Law No.
16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, art. 92 (providing that, "if the Gacaca court to which an appeal is
referred finds that the appellant has been classified in an inaccurate category, it classifies him or her in
the category corresponding to offenses of which he or she is accused, and tries him or her at first and
last resort").
269. Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, art. 93.
270. Ironside, supra note 98, at 54.
2004]
35
Bolocan: Bolocan: Rwandan Gacaca
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
XXII. GACACA IN THE RWANDAN SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT
The Gacaca jurisdictions cannot be seen in isolation, but rather they must be
seen in the civil-political context characterizing transitional Rwanda.2 7 1 Despite
improvements over the last few years, the Tutsi dominated Rwandan government
is still generally perceived as being neither pluralistic nor genuinely democratic. 72
The ruling party, RPF, dominates all the levers of power: the security services, the
bureaucracy, the judiciary, banks, universities and state-owned companies. 273 The
perceived exclusion of the majority Hutu from many government institutions,
including the judiciary, makes the issue of genuine power-sharing a particularly
pressing one.274 This, in turn, fuels continuing political instability and social-
ethnic tension, exacerbating dangers that the Gacaca jurisdictions may be vulner-
able to local, political, and ethnic dynamics.275
In this context, some of the prisoners fear that the introduction of Gacaca
courts may legitimize "popular retribution" on those presumed to be responsible
for the genocide.276 Moreover, the Rwandan government's position that the
Gacaca courts will not hear accusations of war crimes and crimes against human-
ity committed by soldiers of the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF, previously
RPA), which must be taken to the regular courts, reinforces the perception of
Gacaca as political justice and has been questioned by ordinary Rwandans as well
as international observers.277
271. Sarkin, supra note 78, at 159. See also Vandeginste, Victims of Genocide, supra note 105, at
249 (observing that the context in which Gacaca jurisdictions operate is not "neutral," but one charac-
terized over time by intermitting armed conflict, genocide and political transition).
272. See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003: Rwanda (2003), available at http://www.hrw.
org/wr2k3/africa9.html (last visited on Oct. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, World Re-
port] (reporting that the Rwandan government... demonstrated continuing hostility towards political
dissent, press freedom and an independent civil society"). According to TIE ECONOMIST, "Rwanda is
tranquil: a staggering achievement. But the way the government enforces peace is disturbing."
Rwanda ten years on, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2004. Indeed, perhaps inevitably given the circum-
stance under which it came to power, "Rwanda's government is unique in Africa in that it tries to
control not only what its citizens do, but also what they think [and] the RPF exercises tighter control
over the country than perhaps any other African ruling party. There is no freedom of the press, be-
cause that might allow "divisionists" to spread once more their foul ideology. There is no freedom of
association, either. Anyone who tries to set up a serious opposition party is subject to harassment,
arrest and threats .... Membership of the RPF is not compulsory, but prominent Rwandans come
under great pressure to join." The Road out of Hell, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 2004. See also Am-
nesty International, Rwanda: Deeper into the Abyss - Waging war on civil society (July 6, 2004),
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/rwanda/document.do?id=80256DD400782B8 4802
56EC900405DD4 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
273. See Kagame Won, supra note 89.
274. See Sarkin, supra note 78, at 152 (stating that "Hutus, for the most part, have been completely
marginalized both politically and economically"). See also Charles Bigirimana, It's tension all over as
Kigaly heads for elections, May 12, 2003, ALL AFRICA GLOBAL MEDIA, at http://www.allafrica.com
/stories/200305140605.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
275. Uvin, supra note 5, at 7.
276. See Penal Reform International, Research on the Gacaca-PRI Report V (Sept. 2003), available
at www.penalreform.org/english/gacacajresearch.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) [hereinafter PRI
Report V] (reporting that, at least in one case, allegations were made that survivors had plotted to
denounce all Hutus as genocidaires regardless of their actual participation in the killings).
277. See Human Rights Watch, World Report, supra note 272 (stating that the government tried to
prevent the ICTR from investigating RDF suspects); Amnesty International, Question of Justice, supra
note 83, at 28-29 (indicating this as a factor of reduced community participation during the Gacaca
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On the other hand, there is widespread fear among survivors' groups that
Gacaca may amount to de facto amnesty for those who committed terrible
crimes. 278 Fear is sometimes compounded by frustration at the realization that, in
many instances, prisoners may confess to their crimes with defiance and without
showing the slightest remorse.279 In general, there are concrete risks that Gacaca
trials will be manipulated and "used for settling personal scores, political issues,
issues of land and property, and family issues.
280
The genocide has profoundly changed the social geography and composition
of Rwandese communities. About 800,000 people were killed during the geno-
cide, and some 80,000 individuals are currently still imprisoned as genocide sus-
pects. Moreover, about 700,000 "old caseload refugees" recently returned to the
country after decades of exile.28' In total, the UN High Commissioner for Refu-
gees has estimated that 3.2 million refugees returned to Rwanda in the period
between 1993 and 2002.282 These factors, coupled with the policy of forced col-
lective resettlement pursued by the government since 1996, have radically altered
the makeup of most Rwandan communities, possibly irremediably compromising
the participatory and active role they should play to guarantee the effective func-
283tioning of the Gacaca jurisdictions.  The degree of public engagement necessary
for the new Gacaca jurisdictions to function effectively might be further hampered
by survivors' concerns for their security, and fears that they might be victimized
pilot phase); Amnesty International, Enduring Legacy, supra note 198 (reporting that justice officials'
claims that 1,800 members of the RPA were serving sentences for human rights abuses as of Oct. 2003
were contradicted by information obtained from the Military Prosecutor's Office indicating that only a
few dozen of them had actually been prosecuted, and that those found guilty served minimal sen-
tences). See also Catherine Honeyman et al., Establishing Collective Norms: Potentials for Participa-
tory Justice in Rwanda, 10 PEACE & CONFLICT: J. OFTHE AMER. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N. 1, 13 (2004)
(lamenting the "corrosive effects of [the] assumed disregard for Hutu lives" where people in a village
realized that "Inkiko-Gacaca could not even record the names of Hutus who had died in the cellule").
278. See Waldorf, supra note 198. See also Vandeginste, Justice, supra note 153, at 24 (stating that
some survivors' groups have expressed concerns that genocide crimes will be "trivialized" through
trials under Gacaca).
279. See PRI Report V, supra note 276, at 9 (observing that, in many instances, individuals suspected
of genocide related crimes do not seem to be willing to take responsibility for their acts-which they
attribute to "bad policy of the former govemment"-even when they confess to having committed
them).
280. Sarkin, supra note 78, at 161. See also CAGEP Consult for USAID/Rwanda and Ministry of
Justice and Institutional Relations, Assessment of the Judicial Sector in Rwanda, Nov. 2002 [hereinaf-
ter CAGEP Consult, Assessment of the Judicial Sector] (warning that judges could be subject to pres-
sure from a variety of sources including administrative authorities, wealthy individuals, security ser-
vices, as well as families of victims and alleged perpetrators).
281. Uvin, supra note 5, at 10. Old caseload refugees are Tutsi refugees who have lived outside
Rwanda for decades. Id.
282. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Voluntary Repatriation in Africa: Levels
and Trends 1993-2002 Table 2 (Mar. 4, 2004), at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc
.pdf?tbl=SPECIAL&page=events&id=404886df4 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
283. Vandeginste, Justice, supra note 153, at 1 (stating that the Rwandese "social tissue ... has
broken down"). See also Daly, Punitive and Reconstructive Justice, supra note 76, at 380 (stating that
in many parts of Rwanda "there may be no such thing as community," and that the Gacaca jurisdic-
tions may prove ineffective in communities largely composed of people who were not part of them
during the genocide); African Rights, supra note 146, at 41 (estimating that it might be almost impos-
sible to uncover the truth in regions predominantly inhabited by old caseload refugees or where there
are barely any genocide survivors).
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again. 284 This, in turn, may lead to further violence, instead of fostering peace. In
March 2004 alone, fourteen people were sentenced to death and three to life im-
prisonment for having killed genocide survivors who were expected to testify
before the Gacaca courts.285 Not surprisingly, all these factors seem to have
played a role in the so far low community participation in Gacaca, with the gov-
ernment estimating absenteeism in eight out of twelve jurisdictions during the
pilot stage. 286  According to Penal Reform International-a Paris-based NGO
involved in monitoring Gacaca-Rwandans are somehow still extremely skeptical
of the courts, with more than half the population unwilling to participate actively
in the process.
287
While the government has reacted to the reluctant engagement of Rwandans
by creating a "duty to participate" in the court's activities, 288 it is doubted that this
will favor genuine commitment to the system. There is a risk that, although
Gacaca provides an opportunity for ordinary people to be involved in the admini-
stration of justice to an unprecedented degree, "this is not a role with which they
are familiar, nor one of their own choosing. The [new] Gacaca courts do not have
[the] prior credibility of... an acknowledged traditional authority or belief system
[common to] customary approaches to justice" remaining, instead, a state crea-
tion.289 Finally, concerns have been raised that-similar to colonial uses of in-
digenous dispute resolution systems-a state-mandated use of Gacaca to deal with
genocide cases may undermine its original value as an informal, spontaneous dis-
pute resolution mechanism.
29°
XXIII. SEEKING JUSTICE, MOVING FORWARD: PROPOSALS TO MITIGATE
SHORTCOMINGS IN GACACA
This section of the paper tries to strike a balance between justice and recon-
ciliation, punishment and restorative measures. Where justice in the form of retri-
bution and punishment is sought, it is argued, fundamental due process rights
should be respected. On the other hand, if Gacaca is not to become simply "an-
284. Nicole Itano, Rwandan Community Courts Slow to Bring Justice, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Nov. 8, 2002, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1108/p08s01-woaf.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2004). See also PRI Report V, supra note 276, at 5 (observing that, in some areas, survivors and
witnesses are reluctant to testify as they fear for their personal security).
285. UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs, Rwanda: Nine sentenced to death over
killing of genocide survivors, Mar. 8, 2004, available at www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportlD=-39896
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
286. Waldorf, supra note 198.
287. See also PRI Report V, supra note 276, at 18 (reporting that more than half of the population do
not wish to participate actively in the Gacaca sessions).
288. Organic Law, No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, art. 29. Article 29 states:
Every Rwandan citizen has the duty to participate in the Gacaca courts activities. Any person
who omits or refuses to testify ... shall be prosecuted by the Gacaca court ... [and] incurs a
prison sentence from three (3) months to six (6) months. In case of repeat offence, the defendant
may incur a prison sentence from six (6) months to (1) one year.
Id.
289. African Rights, supra note 146, at 3. See also Uvin, supra note 5, at 10 (stating that the gov-
ernment's process of "sensitization" to the Gacaca jurisdictions has been, at least initially, mostly "top-
down" and one-sided, neglecting the adoption of a more "horizontal," participatory approach, and
reporting the lack of involvement of NGOs in the formulation and design of the courts).
290. Vandeginste, Justice, supra note 153, at 22-23. See also Sarkin, supra note 78, at 170.
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other layer in the implementation of genocide trials, '291 a shift in the emphasis
from a predominantly retributive scheme to one more restorative is needed.
While fraught with challenges, the best contribution Gacaca may make is to
prove that, far from being mutually incompatible, both the quest for justice and
reconciliation are indeed possible and can be reconciled in some way.
While human rights activists have strongly criticized the disregard of due
process rights in Gacaca, other observers have regarded this as the price to be paid
in view of its purported restorative, therapeutic, communitarian approach.292 The
truth is that in transitional societies recovering from atrocities perfect justice will
more likely be a utopia. This is even more so in the case of Rwanda, where no
system in the world would be able to deliver model justice if challenged by a
293
comparable situation. This does not mean that Rwanda should abdicate com-
pletely its obligations. While justice may not necessarily be equated with Western
principles, as the experience with the South African TRC has shown, there are
some measures that the Rwandan government could adopt if Gacaca is not to be-
come a "vehicle for summary and arbitrary justice that fails defendants and geno-
cide survivors alike. 294 These measures would imply both amendments to the
Gacaca law and other concrete steps to ensure that dangers implicit in Gacaca are
minimized.
XXIV. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Under the Gacaca law defendants are not entitled to be represented by a law-
yer.295 The law should be amended to include such a possibility, to conform with
international fair trial standards. These standards establish the right to have legal
counsel assigned by the state to indigent defendants where the interest of justice
so requires. 296 Such determination is primarily based on the seriousness of the
offense and the potential maximum punishment. 297 Category 2 defendants who
291. Drumbl, (Al)lure of Genocide Trials, supra note 39, at 224.
292. Id. (arguing that "the more legal or juridical [Glacaca is pressured by the international commu-
nity to become, the less effective it may be in stripping away the silence of complicity, barriers to
shame, and resistance to the therapeutic discussion so needed to heal Rwanda"). See also Ironside,
supra note 98, at 57-58 (stating that "Gacaca offers a promising means for Rwandans to draw together
and gain a greater sense of justice and healing than experienced thus far," and that "as very little justice
has been achieved to date for Rwandans under the status quo ... Gacaca offers a solution ... albeit an
imperfect one").
293. See Ironside, supra note 98, at 57.
294. Press Release, Amnesty International, Rwanda: Gacaca - Gambling with Justice (June 19,
2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR470032002?Open&of=ENG-RWA
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
295. See discussion infra Part XX.
296. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 14 (3)(d). According to this provision, everyone shall be entitled, in the deter-
mination of any criminal charge against him ". . . to defend himself in person or through legal assis-
tance of his own choosing ... and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the
interest of justice so require, and without payment by him in any case if he does not have sufficient
means to pay for it." Id.
297. See Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary 259-60
(N.P. Engel, Arlington 1993). For instance, the Human Rights Committee has held that any person
charged with a crime punishable by death must have counsel assigned. See Henry v. Jamaica
(571/1994), July 25, 1996, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57D/57
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are liable to lengthy prison terms, up to 30 years imprisonment-i.e. those ac-
cused of murder or attempted murder-should be entitled to legal counsel at the
expense of the state. Given the still acute shortage of legal personnel in Rwanda,
a legal aid scheme could be set up that would include not only full-fledged law-
yers, but also other categories such as legal advisors, law professors, law students,
and representatives of NGOs that have a background and experience in human
rights in general and fair trial standards in particular. To encourage their partici-
pation, the Rwandan government, with the assistance of the international donor
community, could make some form of benefits available.
Alternatively, for the same crimes under Category 2, the recourse to the
Gacaca jurisdictions could be made conditional upon consent of the defendants
themselves. Should they not consent they should be tried by the ordinary courts,
where respect for due process rights is at least nominally guaranteed.
Given the difficult and professional nature of the task imposed upon Gacaca
judges, it appears that provisions should be made to grant them some form of
compensation, 298 either in the form of a "salary-type remuneration" or other form
of non-monetary compensation, such as the payment of primary care assistance or
primary school fees for their children. 29 While the first option may be unattain-
able given the high number of judges, and the fact that it is less akin to the phi-
losophy of Gacaca courts as instruments of popular justice, symbolic forms of
compensation may satisfy direct needs of individuals while at the same time con-
tribute to longer-term prospects of societal development. 300 A recent initiative by
the Rwandan government directed at providing free medical insurance to families
of the Gacaca judges should be welcomed as a first step in this direction.3 ' Such
arrangements reduce the risk and perception of corruption, enhance the status and
prestige of judges in the eyes of the community, as well as represent an incentive
favoring their long-term commitment to the Gacaca process.
Additional training should also be provided to all judges in order to enable
them to best perform their difficult mandate. This training should be particularly
targeted at members of the cell Gacaca benches, who perform the crucial function
of categorizing all accused.
XXV. STRIKING A BALANCE: JUSTICE VERSUS RECONCILIATION
In the aftermath of the genocide, the exclusive recourse to criminal trials, ad-
judication and imprisonment as mechanisms of individual accountability have
1/1994 (1996).
298. Compensation proportionate to the responsibility and social status conferred by the judicial
office is an important requirement to support individual judicial integrity. See Oxner, supra note 239,
at 23.
299. See Gacaca Jurisdictions, supra note 2. See also CAGEP Consult, Assessment of the Judicial
Sector, supra note 280, at 75 (reporting that 41.5 percent of judges think the provision of some form of
remuneration is necessary to guarantee the success of Gacaca).
300. See Gacaca Jurisdictions, supra note 2. While the majority of Gacaca judges are in favor of
some form of compensation, some of them favor such compensation to be in the form of "free trans-
port, health expenses, school fees for their children ... [or anything else] that will ... confer [some]
standing on them." See African Rights, supra note 146, at 15.
301. Zac Nsenga, Rwandan Ambassador to the United States, in a personal communication to the
author (Nov. 11, 2004).
[Vol. 2
40
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2004, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2004/iss2/2
Rwandan Gacaca
failed to promote justice and societal reconciliation. 30 2 There is a risk that, fully
implementing the project of popular retribution as currently envisaged in the
Gacaca jurisdictions may further antagonize what is an already deeply divided
society, and compromise the many potential strengths of Gacaca as a vehicle of
participatory, restorative justice.
While prosecuting and punishing the worst perpetrators of genocide in
Rwanda (i.e. the leaders and organizers as well as those who committed the kill-
ings) seems to be necessary to instill a culture of accountability and break the
cycle of impunity, "it may be insufficient to strike on its own at the root" the inner
social and political factors which made such large scale atrocity possible, and
which can, if left unaltered, determine its recurrence.
30 3
As it has been argued, the nature of Rwanda as a dualist post-genocidal soci-
ety characterized by unavoidable Hutu-Tutsi interdependence and commingling,
coupled with the high degree of public participation and complicity in the geno-
cide, make it well-suited to benefit from restorative justice approaches that priori-
tize the restoration of peace in local communities by repairing injuries, encourag-
ing repentance, promoting rehabilitation, and, eventually, facilitating reintegra-
tion. °4 Shifting the emphasis from the retributive to the restorative paradigm,
within or outside Gacaca, may indeed better guarantee justice and individual ac-
countability without compromising the achievement of peace and stability in the
long-term. 3°5 It would also considerably offset human rights concerns linked to
Gacaca's disregard for due process rights of defendants.
XXVI. COMPLEMENTING THE PROSECUTORIAL MODEL: ESTABLISHING A
TRUTH COMMISSION
Trials by Gacaca may become more effective where they are complemented
306by the functioning of a truth commission. The commission would be an inde-
pendent body comprised of individuals from all ethnic groups, each with objective
credibility for their moral integrity, impartiality, and fairness. 30 The mandate of
such commission should be all-encompassing, by investigating not only crimes
committed by the Hutu population in the context of the genocide, but also human
rights violations committed by the RPF in the context of the civil war. Like in
South Africa, this would send the message that the government respects human
rights so much that it would respect the rights of even those who supported the
302. See Drumbl, Sclerosis, supra note 10, at 288. See also Sarkin, supra note 78, at 288; MINOW,
supra note 15, at 51 (calling for an "honest modesty" about the transformative potential of trials).
303. See Kritz, Progress and Humility, supra note 13, at 60.
304. See Drumbl, (Al)lure of Genocide Trials, supra note 39, at 221-25, 229.
305. Id. at 229 (arguing that a restorative justice model may create in Rwanda "fertile ground" for the
growth of much needed multi-ethnic power-sharing structures and institutions).
306. Some authors have recommended that Rwanda establish a truth commission to investigate geno-
cide-related crimes. See Sarkin, supra note 78, at 166-70 (arguing against the role to be played by
Gacaca in trying genocide suspects, and proposing, instead, the exclusive prosecution of the main
leaders of the genocide together with the establishment of an independent truth commission). See also
Drumbl, Sclerosis, supra note 10, at 296 (proposing the establishment of a truth commission involving
not only victims and perpetrators, but also international actors who-directly or indirectly--enabled
the violence).
307. See Kritz, Progress and Humility, supra note 13, at 61 (discussing proposals to create a Truth
and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
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genocide and personally committed atrocities.308 Addressing such crimes would
also pose the basis for mutuality and full historical accuracy. It could also criti-
cally confer the commission much needed legitimacy, altering the so far wide-
spread perception that victor's justice is being pursued in Rwanda. Similar to the
South African TRC, the commission would travel the country providing Rwan-
dans, victims and perpetrators alike, with an impartial forum to recount their his-
tory and give their version of the truth. While the commission would call on per-
petrators to give their side of the story and to repent for their actions, it would not,
like the TRC, exchange truth for amnesty.
Such a forum could help Rwanda in establishing a much needed historical ac-
count not only of what happened but also of why it happened. The striking extent
of public participation in the atrocities, and the fact that so many Rwandans were
complicit in the face of their public nature, strongly argue for the need to shed
light on the underlying factors that made these atrocities possible. The "open,
discursive nature" of a truth commission would arguably better address the prob-
lem of widespread complicity in the genocide. 3° In order to establish as truthful
and comprehensive a picture as possible, the commission would not only investi-
gate individual abuses, but also focus on the broader socio-political context in
which they occurred. In particular, it would examine the role played by various
sectors of the society, like the religious leadership, the media, and the political
establishment that actively supported and encouraged the genocidal violence.31 °
In South Africa, an entire volume of the TRC's Final Report was dedicated to the
findings of institutional hearings, and proved to be indispensable in ascribing
important political responsibilities to the government and political-societal appara-
tus. 3 1 Likewise, in Rwanda, this would somehow permit to hold whole sectors-
that will never be the subject of criminal prosecutions-accountable for the geno-
cide, as well as create an historical record of the causes and wider context of an
otherwise inexplicable violence. Not doing so, on the other hand, would perpetu-
ate mutual distrust, engender the ethnic divide and irremediably compromise any
prospect of genuine, lasting peace in Rwanda.
In a unique and innovative way, the commission would also substantially ex-
pand its mission of truth gathering by calling attention not only to the atrocities
committed, but also by documenting the positive stories of "ordinary heroes,"
those who, at great personal risk, maintained their humanity and protected Tutsi
neighbors and others who were targeted in the frantic wave of violence.
312
Most importantly, such a truth seeking process could help the Rwandan soci-
ety move towards a common and consensual account of the causes and character
of wrongdoing before, during, and after the genocide. This would create an unde-
308. See Daly, Transformative Justice, supra note 27, at 155 (commenting on the benefits of the
South African TRC).
309. See Aukerman supra note 27, at 82 (generally discussing benefits of truth commissions).
310. See Little, supra note 27, at 77 (discussing the mandate of the proposed Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
311. See van Zyl, supra note 61, at 749 (discussing the South African TRC).
312. This aspect was included in the project for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in Bosnia Herzegovina. Despite the promises it held, the establishment of the commis-
sion was aggressively opposed by senior officials within the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia who were concerned about its future interaction and competition with the tribu-
nal's role and activities. See Kritz, Progress and Humility, supra note 13, at 61-67.
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niable, irreversible truth in a country where even the teaching of history is seen as
controversial. As it has been observed, the development of a "common national
historical narrative" based on a shared interpretation of the facts is indispensable if
perpetrators and victims are to continue to live together. 313 By providing a na-
tional forum for victims from all sides of the conflict, the commission would fa-
cilitate a national dialogue between Rwandans on the genocide, its causes and,
hopefully, the kinds of reforms-both at the institutional and political level-
needed to prevent its recurrence. The commission would complement, not re-
place, trials for the most egregious violations before the special genocide cham-
bers. It would also work in parallel with trials conducted by Gacaca, although
these would be conducted differently from their current design.
XXVII. ENHANCING THE RESTORATIVE ASPECT OF GACACA
The restorative potential of Gacaca proceedings could be enhanced by partly
drawing on the approach taken by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Rec-
onciliation (CRTR), which was established in East Timor with the assistance of
the United Nations in 2001. Besides being tasked with establishing the truth about
human rights violations committed in East Timor under Indonesian rule, the
CRTR has been responsible for an innovative "Community Reconciliation Proc-
ess" directed at favoring the reintegration into local communities of persons ac-
cused of having committed less serious crimes in the context of the political vio-
lence infesting the territory between 1974 and 1999.314 This process has been
regarded as representing "less an amnesty solution . . . than a model for conflict
management permitting [perpetrators of lesser crimes] . . . to return to their
homes" upon taking responsibility for their actions and carrying out some form of
community service to the benefit of the local population.31 5
Under the new scheme, Gacaca courts would continue to try Category 2 de-
fendants (i.e. the perpetrators, or accomplices of homicide or serious assault re-
sulting in death, those who attempted to kill, and those responsible for other as-
saults). These courts would, on the other hand, be stripped of their retributive
functions and reconfigured to fashion sentences in a more flexible, creative way
for the lesser offenses committed by Category 2 defendants (comprising persons
who committed assaults or who were accomplices in committing assaults without
the intention to kill their victims). Doing so would enhance the restorative nature
313. See Susan Dwyer, Reconciliation for Realists, 13 ETHIcS & INT'L AFF. 81, 89-90 (1999). See
also Aukerman, supra note 27, at 89 (stating that, by articulating "many sides of the same story...
[truth commissions] may be . . . better at fostering social solidarity in societies where guilt runs in
multiple directions").
314. See Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and National Reconcilia-
tion: The UN Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 952, 953 (2001) [hereinafter
Stahn]. For a description of the Community Reconciliation Process, see UNTAET Regulation No.
2001/10, Part IV (July 13, 2001) (on the establishment of a Commission for Reception, Truth and
Reconciliation in East Timor), available at http://www.easttimor-reconciliation.org.
315. See Stahn, supra note 314, at 957. Perpetrators of lesser crimes are in this way granted immu-
nity from civil and criminal prosecution. Under this scheme, serious criminal offenses, such as crimes
against humanity, murder, torture, and rape, are prosecuted by special panels of the Dili District Court,
while for minor offenses such as theft, minor assault, arson, or the killing of livestock, the individual
may request to participate in the Community Reconciliation Process. Id. at 960-61, 964.
20041
43
Bolocan: Bolocan: Rwandan Gacaca
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
of Gacaca and also eliminate most due process concerns linked to its current im-
plementation.
In these cases, and partly mirroring the procedure before the East Timorese
CRTR, the accused individual may apply to participate in a Community Recon-
ciliation Process by submitting a statement to Gacaca that includes a full descrip-
tion of the relevant acts, an admission of responsibility, and a renunciation of the
use of violence for ethnic and political motives. 316 The case would then be exam-
ined by the Gacaca judges. At the public Gacaca hearing, the judges will hear
from the applicant, the victim, and other members of the community, as it is cur-
rently envisaged. In a variation of the process, and upon hearing suggestions
made by the victim and the applicant alike, the judges will then inform the perpe-
trator of the act of reconciliation deemed most appropriate in the specific case.
This may include the performance of community service, reparation, public apol-
ogy, and/or any, other "act of contrition," along with a prescribed time limit for
performance.
In determining the most appropriate act of reconciliation, the Gacaca judges
will consider not only the actual nature of the crime, but also the total number of
acts committed by the applicant, as well as his role in the commission of the
crime. In the latter case, special emphasis will be put on whether the applicant
was actively involved in the planning, organization, or ordering of the crime, or
was following the orders of others in carrying it OUt.3 18 If accepted by the appli-
cant, the act of reconciliation would be confirmed in a Community Reconciliation
Agreement signed by him and by the Gacaca panel and then registered in the dis-
trict court. The district court would have the discretion to reject an agreement if it
finds that the act of reconciliation exceeds what is "reasonably proportionate" to
the acts disclosed or that it violates human rights principles. 31 9 Should the perpe-
trator subsequently fail to fulfill the terms of the agreement, the case will be re-
turned to Gacaca for normal adjudication.
In cases where either the victim or the applicant disagree with the act of rec-
onciliation proposed by the Gacaca panel, the procedure and penalties currently
envisaged for perpetrators of lesser crimes belonging to Category 2 would con-
tinue to apply. 20 Unlike the current Gacaca process, as a result of which different
prison terms and/or community service are automatically applicable-in the latter
case upon the confessor's approval-the new process would actively involve vic-
tims and perpetrators, with their community supporters, to decide the form ac-
countability will take. It would thus empower all people concerned to "determine
their needs at the most local level."3 2'
Allowing the community to creatively and flexibly fashion sentences for the
least serious crimes would importantly recognize that victims have different re-
covery needs, and would arguably give them a more powerful voice than what is
316. See UNTAET Reg. No. 2001/10 § 23.
317. See id. § 27.7. See also Kritz, Progress and Humility, supra note 13, at 79 (generally describing
the CRTR's Community and Reconciliation Process).
318. See id. Schedule 1.
319. UNTAET Reg. No. 2001/10 §§ 27.8, 28.2.
320. See Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, supra note 4, arts. 54, 56, 58, 62-65, 73.
321. See Daly, Punitive and Reconstructive Justice, supra note 76, at 391 (suggesting that the Gacaca
law be amended to empower the courts to grant selective and conditional amnesty).
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currently envisaged in the Gacaca process. It would also better reflect-in a situa-
tion where government hate propaganda and manipulation have had such a devas-
tating impact-the different gradations of individual and collective responsibility
that may emerge from the Gacaca hearings. Shifting the focus from the possibility
of retribution in the form of imprisonment and/or performance of community
service, to a variety of optional restorative measures would also enhance chances
that the defendant will effectively reintegrate into the community. By focusing
more closely on the needs of all parties involved in the crime, including the victim
and the community where it took place, the restorative nature of Gacaca would
guarantee a genuinely holistic approach to justice and, hopefully, increase the
chances of peaceful coexistence in the future.
XXVIII. CONCLUSION
The challenging task of combining retribution with reconciliation is most
daunting in transitional societies recovering from mass violence. The Rwandan
experience shows the limits of the conventional prosecutorial approach in achiev-
ing these goals, and points towards the need for innovation and flexibility as part
322
of a comprehensive response to horrendous crimes.
Through Gacaca, Rwanda has courageously taken an unexplored path.
Rwanda's unconventional experience in prosecuting genocide suspects through
the use of village courts extends beyond its context by setting a new precedent in
the field of transitional justice and in the search of pragmatic approaches to ac-
countability for atrocities. It represents a test case in creatively shaping and adapt-
ing traditional dispute resolution systems to address the competing, partly con-
flicting goals of justice and reconciliation. Gacaca has a lot of potential: through a
highly inclusive approach, it makes accountability, in the wider sense of justice
and social reconciliation, the ultimate aspiration of every Rwandan. By acknowl-
edging the suffering of individual victims and their families, and by allowing in-
dividuals on both sides of the ethnic and ideological divide to publicly relate their
stories, the Gacaca proceedings may dissipate feelings of collective guilt, foster a
rule of law supportive culture, facilitate reconciliation, and give to participants a
much needed sense of dignity, empowerment and, to some degree, closure. It also
indicates that pragmatic and context-sensitive solutions may potentially achieve
more goals than the traditional approach of criminal prosecutions. Nonetheless,
there are serious flaws in the system that may irremediably compromise the
achievement of these objectives and reinforce the perception of many that a parti-
san version of justice is taking place in the shadows of the genocide.
With retribution retaining a central role in Gacaca, efforts must be made to
respect the due process rights of those brought before it. Although the Rwandan
government still views individual prosecutions-by the ordinary or Gacaca
courts-as the only way of achieving justice, there are a series of alternatives that
could assist in increasing Gacaca's credibility and legitimacy. In this view, a
mixed, multi-dimensional approach combining restorative initiatives-such as the
creation of a truth commission and the reconfiguration of Gacaca to emphasize its
restorative approach for lesser offenses-with trials for the most egregious viola-
322. Strain & Keyes, supra note 93, at 131.
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tions, may better suit the partly conflicting goals of justice and societal regenera-
tion. More importantly, the credibility and ultimate practicability of any post-
genocide accountability mechanism is predicated upon its perceived legitimacy
and, ultimately, even-handedness and ability to deliver genuine justice to all seg-
ments of the population, victims and perpetrators alike. While serious political
and social challenges face the Gacaca jurisdictions, only time will tell whether
these have truly been the last best chance for justice, stability and social reunifica-
tion in a deeply wounded nation.
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